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UNSETTLING MORTGAGE LAW:
IMPLICATIONS FOR
PRACTITIONERS AND TITLE
INSURERS
&DQ·W/LYH:LWKRXW$LU
Title Insurance and the Bursting
of the Real Estate Bubble
Marvin N. Bagwell*
´&DQ·WOLYHFDQ·WEUHDWKHZLWKQRDLUµ1
I.

Prologue

A few months ago, I wrote a brief article originally titled ´A
Fairy Tale,µ which ended up being published in The Bulletin,
The Journal of the New York State Land Title Association³a
title industry publication. Several people who read the article
prior to its publication advised me against releasing it to the
public. The pre-publication readers were hesitant because I
made a startling admission in the article: that people in the
title industry knew that the real estate bubble was about to
burst.2 Their concern was that my admission could be used
* Marvin N. Bagwell is the President and Founder of Bagwell &
Associates Title Agency LLC, which has offices in New York City and in
White Plains, New York. Formerly, he was the Vice-President and Eastern
Divisional Counsel for United General Title Insurance Company. Mr.
Bagwell has served as President of both the New York State Land Title
Association and the Title Industry Rate Service Association. Mr. Bagwell is a
member of the Executive Board of the New York State Bar Real Property
Section and is a Co-(GLWRURIWKH6HFWLRQ·V-RXUQDO+HLVWKHDXWKRURIRYHU
70 published articles on real estate and title insurance law, and most recently
HGLWHG WKH 7LWOH ,QVXUDQFH 6HFWLRQ RI :DUUHQ·V :HHG ,Q  0U %DJZHOO
was elected a Fellow of the American College of Real Estate Lawyers.
1. JORDIN SPARKS DUET WITH CHRIS BROWN, NO AIR (Jive Records 2007).
2. Marvin N. Bagwell, :HDYLQJ D 7DOH RI :RH IURP 7RGD\·V (FRQRPLF
Crisis ² Can this Possibly Be True? Is this a Fairy Tale?, BULL.: J. N.Y. STATE
LAND TITLE ASS·N, Summer 2008, at 3.
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against the entire industry in a court of law or, more
importantly, in the court of public opinion.
Under the system that we employ to conduct real estate
closings or settlements in New York, with all parties sitting
around a closing table, a title company representative is
present at every closing from the smallest residential re-
finance to a multi-million dollar acquisition and mortgaging of
a Manhattan skyscraper. After the closing, title closers would
often return to their offices, wondering how in the world the
borrowers were going to afford their mortgage. How could a
security guard clearing $35,000 annually afford a half-million
dollar mortgage? Was the GM building really worth a billion
and a half dollars? The time came when title people would
wager on how long it would take the borrower to go into
IRUHFORVXUH DIWHU WKH FORVLQJ GDWH  ´+H ZRQ·W PDNH WKH ILUVW
payment. I bet we will receive an order for a foreclosure search
on this property within ninety days. Where are the lenders
REWDLQLQJWKHPRQH\WRPDNHDOORIWKHVHVWXSLGORDQV"µ7KRVH
of us in the title industry knew that something was up, but we
did not know exactly what was going on. As it turns out, we
were right³the bubble was about to burst, but we did not
know as much as we had thought, nor did we fully know
exactly when or why. In any event, had we known and issued
warnings to raise red flags, we would have been ignored.
Forces much greater than any title closer, or even title
company, were at work. Warnings would have been ignored
and we know what happens to the messenger.
Yes, the intent of this Article is to apply some salve to the
conscience of title personnel everywhere by describing (at
probably too great a length) exactly what forces had been
unleashed in the economy that led to the creation and,
eventually, to the bursting of the real estate bubble. The
bursting of the real estate bubble, which many experts think
OHG WR WKH FXUUHQW ILQDQFLDO FULVLV ZDV QRW WKH WLWOH LQGXVWU\·V
fault, but rather, the blame lies with us all.
The history of the bursting of the real estate bubble in
2007 is still being written. Many of the sources cited in this
Article are from newspapers, especially the papers of record,
the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. Since we are
still in the midst of the financial crises, definitive studies and
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books are still being written. To describe what happened, and
what is happening, we will work with what we have.
II. Introduction
It is axiomatic;; bubbles require air. Without air, bubbles,
like the pop version of teenage love, could not exist. Indeed a
bubble is mostly air. One way to define a bubble is as a globule
of liquid inflated with air or gas. When the pressure of the
liquid or air within the bubble becomes too much for the
JOREXOH·V VNLQ WKH EXEEOH ZLOO EXUVW  (FRQRPLFDOO\ ZH DUH
OLYLQJ LQ WKH DIWHUPDWK RI WKH UHDO HVWDWH EXEEOH·V EXUVWLQJ
This is certainly not the first time that an economy was
brought low by the bursting of a bubble. Most historical
GLVFXVVLRQV RI HFRQRPLF EXEEOHV EXUVWLQJ VWDUW ZLWK +ROODQG·V
tulip mania of the eighteenth century, then move on to
(QJODQG·V HQFRXQWHU ZLWK WKH 6RXWK 6HDV EXEEOH RI WKH
nineteenth century and the American railroad bond bubble of
the nineteenth century, followed by the mother of all bubbles,
the 1929 stock market crash, which led to the Great Depression
of the twentieth century. The commonality of each bubble is
that each left economic and financial devastation in its wake.
The purpose of this Article is not to propose a solution to
prevent bubbles from occurring so as to prevent the havoc
caused by their bursting, but to describe what exactly
contributed to the air that inflated the real estate bubble and
which led to its inevitable bursting. For those of you expecting
charts and references to government studies and Ph.D
dissertations, please prepare to be disappointed. Those of us in
the title industry are a simple lot. Our primary references will
be the press reports, the anachronistic printed word.
Hopefully, the flavor of what happened will not be lost on too
many.
Our discussion to coPH ZLOO IRFXV RQ IRXU ´DWLRQVµ
VHFXULWL]DWLRQJOREDOL]DWLRQVSHFXODWLRQUHJXODWLRQRQH´LVPµ
consumerism;; and one word that speaks for itself: fraud. Here
is a warning to the reader: things will not be, as Tina Turner
ZDVNQRZQWRKRSHIRU´QLFHDQGHDV\µ7KHUHZLOOEHRYHUODS
Economic collapses in the real world are messy. Benjamin
)UDQNOLQ RQFH FRPPHQWHG ´VXFFHVV KDV PDQ\ SDUHQWV EXW
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failurHLVDQRUSKDQµ2XUJRDOLQLGHQWLI\LQJWKHVRXUFHVRIWKH
air that inflated the bubble, and that led to its inevitable
bursting, is to empty out the orphanage.
III. Securitization
Air is comprised of many chemical components, some of
which are conducive to life, such as oxygen, nitrogen, and
carbon dioxide;; and others that may lead to the extinction of
humanity, such as carbon monoxide, ozone, and chlorides.
Securitization started out as providing life-giving oxygen to the
financial system, but over the course of three decades evolved
into pumping life-depriving ozone into the system instead.
Securitization works in the following way. We can start
with one set of homebuyers. In order to finance the purchase of
their home, the homebuyers take out a loan. The obligation to
repay the loan is represented by a note. The note, in turn, is
secured by a mortgage on the home. In the 1970s, Lew Ranieri,
then a prominent bond trader at the Wall Street firm Salomon
Brothers,3 developed the process of taking hundreds and
thousands of mortgages and pooling or packaging the
mortgages into bonds.
The bonds were then sold to
institutional investors. This process had the benefit of taking
the mortgages off the hands and the books of the local lender
and putting them into the hands of investors who could be
located anywhere. The local bank sold the mortgage to
investors who, in turn, paid for the bond, thereby providing the
bank with funds to make more mortgage loans. Everyone
involved in the process, from the local bank to the investor, and
especially the Wall Street middlemen who packaged the
mortgages into bonds and who then sold the bonds to the
investor, made money.4
The rules of evolution govern on Wall Street as well.
3. The tale of Salomon Brothers·V rise and fall is immortalized in
0LFKDHO/HZLV·VERRNLIAR·S POKER: RISING THROUGH THE WRECKAGE ON WALL
STREET (1989). As in the case of many financial immortals, Salomon no
longer exists as an independent entity. It is buried somewhere within
Citigroup, which, by the time this Article is read, may no longer exist as a
private financial company either.
4. See Nancy Gibbs, 25 People to Blame, TIME, Feb. 22, 2009, at 20, 25
(describing Mr. Ranieri and the process).
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Relatively simple financial tools evolve into more complex
machinery. Mortgage-backed securities or bonds in turn were
grouped into packages of Collateralized Mortgage Obligations
´&02Vµ  RU &ROODWHUDOL]HG 'HEW 2EOLJDWLRQV ´&'2Vµ 5
Therefore, investors had the opportunity to purchase a debt
instrument such as a CDO for which the underlying source of
payment was not one mortgage, but several thousand of them.
In fact, the underlying obligation of a CDO might not be
individual mortgages, but bonds secured by individual
mortgages.6 And of course, CDOs grew in terms of complexity
and intricacy. Any type of debt that a consumer or corporation
owed, from automobile loans to credit card debt to multi-billion
dollar commercial lease financing, were turned into CDOs.
Even Alan Greenspan, the former Chairman of the Federal
5HVHUYH VDLG WKDW &'2V ZHUH ´EHZLOGHULQJµ7 It was thought
that such obligations carried little risk because, while one
mortgage might go into foreclosure, it would not taint the
entire pool. This turned out not to be the case because, as the
financial crisis deepened, larger and larger percentages of the
PRUWJDJHVLQWKHSRROVEHJDQWRJR´EDGµRUJRLQWRGHIDXOW)RU
example, in one series of mortgage-backed securities sold by
Bank of America in 2007, 16% of the loans in the pool were
sixty or more days overdue.8 In 2007, Citigroup issued a
mortgage-backed security in which 31% of the underlying loans
were sixty or more days delinquent.9 Of course, the higher the
delinquency rate, the less likely the return on the security will
turn out as initially predicted, and the more likely the
5. Drexel Burnham Lambert issued the first CDO in 1987 for Imperial
Savings Association. Gregory Cresci, Merrill, Citigroup Record CDO Fees
Earned in Top Growth Market, BLOOMBERG, Aug. 30, 2005,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000103&sid=a.FcDwf1.ZG4&ref
er=us. Drexel later went defunct and its most famous broker, junk bond king
Michael Milken, went off to prison in 1988 for racketeering and securities
fraud. Alison Leigh Cowan, Milken to Pay $500 Million More In $1.3 Billion
Drexel Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1992, at A1.
6. See Stephen Gandel, One Bad Bond, TIME, Mar. 9, 2009, at 30
(providing an excellent description of the process, from home mortgages to
bonds and more).
7. Alessandra Stanley, Economists Try Target Practice in a Fun-House
Mirror, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2009, at C1.
8. James R. Hagerty & Dan Fitzpatrick, BofA Feels Bite of Move into
Mortgage-Backed Securities, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2009, at C8.
9. Id.
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VHFXULW\·V KROGHU ZLOO LQFXU D ORVV  $OVR DV RQH FDQ VHH WKH
financial instruments are moving further away from the
traditional one mortgage for one homeowner system. In the
SURFHVV KRPHRZQHUV· Dllegiances to their local lenders and
willingness to stretch themselves to make the payments when
under economic duress becomes tenuous at best.10
How big of a problem will losses from securitization
EHFRPH"  1R RQH NQRZV IRU VXUH EXW ´>D@FFRUGLQJ WR ,QVLGe
Mortgage Finance, some eight million nonprime mortgages
were put into securities pools in 2005 and 2006 and sold to
investors. The value of these loans was $797 billion in 2005
DQGELOOLRQLQµ11
To complicate matters further, and partially to protect
investors from losing money if that one mortgage went into
default, Wall Street began to slice and dice the mortgage pools
LQWR ´WUDQFKHVµ  7KH WUDQFKHV DUH VOLFHV RI WKH VDPH SRRO RI
mortgages divided into parts based on the probability that the
mortgages will be paid and not go into foreclosure. The highest
rated mortgages, those that were least likely to go into
foreclosure, would be sold to investors at the lowest interest
rate because the risk of default was the smallest. Conversely,
those mortgages with the highest probability of default were
sold at the highest interest rates to account for the risk that
the homeowners might default and go into foreclosure. Wall
Street also created tranches from the interest due on the
mortgage or from the principal.12 The types, numbers, and
parts of mortgages divided into tranches, and indeed the
process itself, became so dizzying that it became entirely
conceivable that several investors might own identical or
different parts of the same mortgage.13 As we will soon see, for
10. $FFRUGLQJ WR VRPH ZKHQ DSHUVRQ·V LQFRPHEHFRPHV VWUHVVHG KH RU
VKH LV OHVVLQFOLQHG WR ´VWLFN-it-RXWµ ZLWK KLV RU KHU OHQGHU LI WKDW OHQGHU KDV
become a faceless international concern as opposed to his or her local banker.
See Walter Kirn, My Debt, Their Asset, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2006, § 6
(Magazine), at 26.
11. Gretchen Morgenson, Guess What Got Lost in the Loan Pool, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 1, 2009, at BU1.
12. See generally Floyd Norris, In Turnabout, Thain Caved In, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 1, 2008, at C1;; Anise Wallace, Market Place;; Making 'Junk
Bonds' Respectable, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1989, at D1.
13. See Lingling Wei & Alex Frangos, +DQFRFN DW &HQWHU RI ¶7UDQFKH
:DUIDUH·, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2009, at C1 (describing the havoc now on the
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those investors, the complexity of CMOs, CDOs, and the
tranches they inspired would make the foreclosure process
even more of a nightmare.
It takes more than debt for securitization to work. Other
actors are required. First, investors want to know that the
debt will be repaid. The credit rating agencies, particularly
0RRG\·V ,QYHVWRU·V 6HUYLFH 6WDQGDUG  3RRU·V DQG WR D OHVVHU
extent, Fitch Ratings Services, evolved to provide this service.
Indeed, they were basically empowered by federal law as the
only entities that were allowed to rate securities.14 Their job
was to independently assess the ability of borrowers to repay
their loans and to report that ability to lenders in the form of
UDWLQJVJHQHUDOO\IURP´$$$µRU´7ULSOH$µbasically meaning
WKDWWKHGHEWZRXOGEHUHSDLGWR´&µZKLFKWUDQVODWHGWRMXQN
status where repayment would be problematic. Even parts of
CDOs, such as the tranches discussed above, could be rated. Of
course, the better or higher the rating, the lower the
corresponding interest rate.15
Unfortunately, it developed that the rating agencies were
to become victims of a built-in conflict of interest. The sellers
of the securities paid the rating agencies to rate the securities
the sellers would offer to the public. The question became: to
whom did the rating agencies owe their allegiance³to the
public or to the Wall Street firms that paid the rating agencies
WKHLU IHHV DQG DGGHG WR WKH DJHQFLHV· HYHU-increasing profit
coffers? In the aftermath of the bursting of the real estate
bubble, the conclusion reached by the House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform was that the Wall Street
security sellers benefitted from the conflict of interest. As for
the public and investors, the performance of the rating
agencies was D ´FRORVVDO IDLOXUHµ DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH +RXVH
6XEFRPPLWWHH·V FKDLUPDQ +HQU\ :D[PDQ16 However, the
PRVW VHDULQJ LQGLFWPHQW RI WKH UDWLQJ DJHQFLHV· SHUIRUPDQFH
came from one of their own. In an internal e-mail, a Standard
legal horizon which was ignited by the use of tranches);; Gandel, supra note 6.
14. See James Surowiecki, Ratings Downgrade, NEW YORKER, Sept. 28,
2009, at 25.
15. Id.
16. Gretchen Morgenson, Credit Rating Agency Heads Grilled by
Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, at B1;; Gretchen Morgenson, Debt
Watchdogs: Tamed or Caught Napping?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2008, at A1.
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 3RRU·V DQDO\VW ZURWH WKDW ´>D ERQG@ FRXOG EH VWUXFWXUHG E\
FRZVDQGZHZRXOGUDWHLWµ17 No wonder Time magazine chose
.DWKOHHQ&RUEHWZKRUDQ6WDQGDUG 3RRU·VWKHODUJHVWUDWLQJ
agency, as one of the twenty-five people to blame for the
financial meltdown.18
Bond insurance companies, principally Mortgage
*XDUDQWHH ,QVXUDQFH &RUSRUDWLRQ ´0*,&µ  DQG $PEDF
$VVXUDQFH ´$PEDFµ  ZHUH WKH VHFRQG DFWRUV  )RU GHFDGHV
these companies labored in the plain vanilla vineyard of
insuring municipal bonds issued by governmental borrowers.19
The business provided a steady but reasonable income,
primarily because claims were rare and far between. Orange
&RXQW\ &DOLIRUQLD·V EDQNUXSWF\ LQ  SURYHG WKH H[FHSWLRQ
and simultaneously served to promote the necessity for bond
insurance.20 However, in the drive for more profits, both MGIC
and Ambac began to insure more exotic indentures such as
CMOs and CDOs.21 The fact that MGIC or Ambac insured the
bond issues, thereby saying that if the issuer defaulted and did
not make payments when due, the insurance companies would
do so, made it easier for Wall Street to sell the securities to the
public. However, as early as 2006, CDO losses began to raise
FRQFHUQV RQ :DOO 6WUHHW LURQLFDOO\ DERXW 0*,& DQG $PEDF·V
own solvency³that is, their own ability to pay if their insured
bond issuers defaulted. By late 2007, MGIC and Ambac were
in real distress and their survival was in question.22 It took a
major investment offer by Warren Buffet, billions in
recapitalization, and the intervention of the New York State
Insurance Department to steady the bond insurers.23 The bond
17. Gibbs, supra note 4, at 23.
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Michael Lewis & David Einhorn, Op-Ed, The End of the
Financial World As We Know It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, WK 9.
20. Michael Quint, 2UDQJH &RXQW\·V 'HEDFOH &RXOG 3URYH D %RRQ IRU
Bond Insurers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1994, at D6.
21. See Lewis & Einhorn, supra note 19.
22. Vikas Bajaj, Two Bond Insurers End the Week Severely Weakened,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2008, at C2.
23. Vikas Bajaj, Buffett Offers to Reinsure Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12,
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/12/business/12cnd-
buffett.html;; Karen Richardson & Damian Paletta, Spitzer Warns Bond
Insurers;; Governor Says Firms have 3 to 5 Days to Raise Capital, WALL ST. J.,
)HE   DW $ 3UHVV 5HOHDVH 1< 6WDWH ,QV 'HS·W 'HSDUWPHQW
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insurance companies, by enabling securitization, had become
one of its victims.24 As of this date, the companies are still not
RXWRIWKHZRRGV0RRG\·VUHFHQWO\FXW0*,&·VFUHGLW rating to
junk status.25
If the borrowers and sellers of CDOs could buy insurance
plans to ensure the lenders that they would be paid, why not
offer those lenders their own opportunities to buy insurance to
ensure that the borrowers would pay them? This essentially
defines a credit default swap. To use AIG as an example, a
company may sell insurance to lenders, providing them with
protection in the event that a borrower does not make
payments under a CDO or CMO when due. AIG will then
make the payments in the event that the borrower defaults. In
effect, AIG swaps its Triple A credit rating for that of the
borrower if the borrower defaults. Theoretically, this is great
business, until borrowers begin to default.
In September 2008, it became obvious to the Treasury
Department that homeowners, by the millions, were beginning
to default on their mortgage payments.26 The credit markets
also began to take notice that the mortgage insurers, Ambac
and MGIC, did not have the capital to pay all of the losses.27
They were in trouble themselves. The markets noted that AIG,
which had insured trillions of dollars of CDOs and CMOs, only
had billions in capital to pay the losses.28 If AIG collapsed,
lenders throughout the world, including sovereign governments
and lenders to the United States such as China, Japan, Saudi
Arabia, and South Korea, all of whom held billions in U.S. debt,
would have to immediately recognize trillions of dollars of
loses.29 The situation was untenable. If it were to occur, the
Facilitates, Supervises MBIA Split;; Should Add Capacity to Municipal Bond
Insurance
Market
(Feb.
18,
2009),
available
at
http://www.ins.state.ny.us/press/2009/p0902181.htm.
24. Mark Landler & David D. Kirkpatrick, Lobbyists Swarm the
Treasury For a Helping of the Bailout Pie, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2008, at A22.
25. Kathy Shwiff, &ULVLV RQ :DOO 6WUHHW 0RRG\·V 6ODVKHV 5DWLQJV RQ
Mortgage Insurers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2009, at C3.
26. See Lewis & Einhorn, supra note 19.
27. See id.
28. Edmund L. Andrews, Michael J. de la Merced & Mary Williams
Walsh, )HG·V%LOOLRQ/RDQ5HVFXHV,QVXUHU, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at
A1.
29. Id.
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Federal NationaO0RUWJDJH$VVRFLDWLRQ ´)DQQLH0DHµ DQGWKH
)HGHUDO +RPH /RDQ 0RUWJDJH &RUSRUDWLRQ ´)UHGGLH 0DFµ 
(more on them later) might default on their debt and bring the
world economy to its knees. To prevent that from happening,
the Treasury Department bailed out AIG to the tune (to date)
of $150 billion dollars.30 This may not be sufficient. Both the
Wall Street Journal and the New York Times have reported
that AIG will report a $60 billion loss for the fourth quarter of
2008.31 If AIG is unable to obtain the capital to cover the losses
and is forced into bankruptcy, the domino effect would be
KRUUHQGRXV  2WKHU OHQGHUV ZKR KROG $,*·V FUHGLW VZDSV DV
insurance against the losses in their portfolio would have to
take the losses on their own books, thereby eroding their own
capital base and possibly leading to their failure as well.32 In
effect, an AIG failure could bring down many other institutions
with it. This explains why the Treasury advanced funds to AIG
so quickly in late 2008 and may have to do more of the same in
2009.33
Contrary to the explanations offered to the public, the
advanced funds to AIG were meant to benefit the American
public only secondarily, if at all. The real intention of the AIG
bailout was to send the message to the international
FRPPXQLW\ WKDW WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV ZRXOG VWDQG EHKLQG $,*·V
credit swaps. If AIG failed, bonds issued by Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, among others, would have lost their value,
thereby adversely affecting security holders such as central
banks throughout the world. In the case of AIG, history will
show that the profits were indeed privatized with the losses
being passed on to the public. In time, the public will know
that mortgage foreclosures were the furthest thing from
Secretary 3DXOVRQ·V PLQG WKDW IDWHIul weekend in September
when the bubble burst. His eyes were on Beijing, not Peoria.
30. Andrew Ross Sorkin & Mary Williams Walsh, Giant Insurer May Get
More in U.S. Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2008, at A1.
31. Matthew Karnitschnig, Liam Pleven, & Serena Ng, A.I.G. Seeks to
Ease Its Bailout Terms, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2009, at A1;; Mary Williams
Walsh & Michael J. de la Merced, $V $,*·V /RVVHV *URZ ,WV 6XUYLYDO
Options Shrink, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2009, at B5.
32. Walsh & de la Merced, supra note 31.
33. Id. See Joe Nocera, Propping Up A House of Cards, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
28, 2009, at BU1, for a capsule lesson on the AIG drama.
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/HW·V PDNH WKLQJV D OLWWOH PRUH FRPSOLFDWHG  ,Q  D
WHDPDW-30RUJDQ&KDVH &R ´-30RUJDQµ GHYHORSHGDQHZ
kind of financial instrument which combined CDOs and credit
default swaps.34 CDOs were underlain by real mortgages given
by individual corporate lenders to lenders, and credit default
swaps were essentially insurance policies taken out by lenders.
However, this new financial instrument called a synthetic
collateralized default obligation, or synthetic CDO, derived its
value not from concrete instruments such as mortgages, but
from contracts linked to those mortgages, hence the term
´GHULYDWLYHVµ35 The fact that they were derived from the
contract brought rise WRWKHXVHRIWKHWHUP´GHULYDWLYHVµ36 The
ZRUG´V\QWKHWLFµVKRXOGKDYHEHHQDFOXHWRLQYHVWRUVWRWKURZ
up a red flag. However, synthetic CDOs generated outsized
returns which resulted in more and more investors purchasing
them. Many did not actually know what they were buying.
The complexity of these instruments is mind boggling, but
suffice it to say, when the values of real mortgages began to fall
because of rising defaults and foreclosure rates, the value of
synthetic investments began to drop even faster.37
The
investment banks that created, promoted, and sold these
investments began to suffer staggering losses, thus eating into
their capital.38 To protect the banking system, something had
to be done. The investment bank Bear Stearns Companies Inc.
failed to raise enough capital and had to be rescued by
JPMorgan and the federal taxpayer for less than the value of
its headquarters building.39 The Treasury allowed another
investment bank, Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., to go into
bankruptcy,40 an event which some experts believe only made

34. Gretchen Morgenson, How the Thundering Herd Faltered and Fell,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008, at BU1.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., id. (describing such a situation).
39. See, e.g., Landon Thomas, Jr., JPMorgan and Fed Move to Bail Out
Bear Stearns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2008, at BU1.
40. See, for example, Ben White & Michael M. Grynbaum, The Street
After Lehman Brothers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008, at C1, for a blow-by-blow,
minute-by-minute description of the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
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things worse for the world economy.41 Merrill Lynch & Co.,
Inc. rushed into the saving arms of Bank of America.42 When
the air which securitization pumped into the real estate bubble
ILQDOO\OHGWRWKHEXEEOH·VEXUsting, securitization, like animals
in the wild, had eaten its young. Alan S. Blinder, Professor of
Economics and Public Affairs at Princeton University asked
UKHWRULFDOO\ ´>'@RHV DQ\RQH GRXEW WKDW WKH ILQDQFLDO WXUPRLO
would have been less severe if derivatives trading had acquired
D]RRNHHSHUDGHFDGHDJR"µ43
Securitization had a more nefarious effect closer to home
for those who purchased the mortgages. Every securitization
starts with a single mortgage. When the borrower defaults and
fails to make a payment due upon that mortgage, the usual
remedy for the lender to realize its secured interest is
foreclosure. To be successful in a foreclosure action, indeed
even to make it past the courthouse door, the lender must
prove to the court that it owns the mortgage. As noted above,
securitization involves the slicing, dicing, and re-packaging of
mortgages. Most states have recording statutes which require
that a mortgage must be assigned of record when its ownership
changes.44 Within the foreclosure bar and the foreclosure
defense bar, it is no secret that one of the effects of the
packaging, securitization, and sale of mortgages is that the
assignment chain and actual documentation of mortgage
ownership have failed to keep up. Ironically, the pooling and
packaging of mortgages³the securitization process³which
enabled lenders to make even more mortgages and greater
profits, has made it more difficult for those lenders to foreclose
when the mortgages go bad.45 The process also makes it more
41. Eric Dash, et al., 5 days of Pressure, Fear and Ultimately, Failure,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008.
42. See, e.g., Louise Story & Julie Creswell, Love Was Blind, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 8, 2009, at BU1 (detailing the unhappy marriage between Merrill Lynch
and Bank of America).
43. Alan S. Blinder, Six Blunders En Route to a Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
25, 2009, at BU7.
44. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 701.02 (West 2009);; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-
2223 (2008);; N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 291 (McKinney 2009). See also JAMES
KARP & ELLIOT KLAYMAN, REAL ESTATE LAW (5th ed. 2003);; DAVID A.
SCHMUDDE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MORTGAGES AND LIENS (2004).
45. Gretchen Morgenson, How One Borrower Beat the Foreclosure
Machine, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2008, at BU1.
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difficult for borrowers to modify their mortgages in a bid to
ward off foreclosure³a difficulty which even President Obama
KDV VDLG ´PDNHV QR VHQVHµ46 It is well known that original
mortgage documents are routinely lost somewhere between the
initial lender, the loan servicer, and the purchaser of the CDO
that includes the mortgage (or a part of it). As a result, it is
RIWHQDQ\RQH·VJXHVVDVWRZKRDFWXDOO\RZQVRUKDVSRVVHVVLRQ
of the original mortgage. When the issue at hand may result in
someone losing their home, the courts have not been willing to
DFFHSW´DQ\RQH·VJXHVVµDVWKHDSSURSULDWHOHJDOVWDQGDUG47
The problem of lost loan documentation leading to a lender
(or loan servicer) losing the standing to foreclose upon a
mortgage very recently caught more of the naWLRQDO PHGLD·V
attention. In her article for the New York Times, Gretchen
0RUJHQVRQQRWHGWKDW´ERRNNHHSLQJµWKHSURSHUDVVLJQPHQWRI
pooled mortgages and the recording of those assignments in the
public record, was not a priority of many big banks.48
´%ookkeeping is such a bore, especially when there are billions
to be made shoveling loans into trusts like coal into the
7LWDQLF·V ERLOHUV  <RX FDQ LPDJLQH WKH WKRXJKW SURFHVV
Assigning notes takes time and costs money, why bother?
:KR·V JRLQJ WR DVN IRU proof of ownership of these notes
DQ\KRZ"µ49 Ms. Morgenson wrote:
No one knows how many loans went into
securitization
trusts
with
defective
documentation. But as messes go, this one has,
ahem, potential. According to Inside Mortgage
Finance, some eight million nonprime mortgages
were put into securities pools in 2005 and 2006
and sold to investors. The value of these loans
was $797 billion in 2005 and $815 billion in
2006.50

46. Edmund L. Andrews, Obama Plan on Housing Said to Push on
Lenders, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2009, at B1.
47. Morgenson, supra note 11.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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As reported by Ms. Morgenson, bankruptcy judges throughout
the country have started to deny motions to permit foreclosure
where the lender cannot prove ownership of the mortgage.51 R.
Glen Ayers, a former bankruptcy judge in Texas, and an expert
in the area, VD\V WKDW IRU OHQGHUV ´>L@W·V D KXJH SUREOHP    
,W·V JRLQJ WR EH H[SHQVLYH , GRQ·W NQRZ KRZ H[SHQVLYH
XOWLPDWHO\WRWKHERQGKROGHUVµ52 Of course, the possibility that
courts may deny foreclosure to lenders can only decrease the
value of the CDOs and CMOs based upon those mortgages that
the lenders are holding as assets in their vaults. Translated,
because of bad documentation, the major banks will experience
even greater losses and will need even more capital to
survive³capital that, to date, only taxpayers have the
wherewithal to provide.53 And the nightmares of both the
bankers and the taxpayers, who apparently may have to pay
the bill, have begun.
Beginning in Ohio, and quickly spreading to New York,
many courts have either delayed or tossed out foreclosure
actions where the plaintiff-lender has been unable to show
public record ownership of the subject mortgage.54 The case of
Mamie Ruth Palmer, a seventy-four year old former
housekeeper living in Atlanta, made the popular press. In
2002, Ms. Palmer filed for bankruptcy to protect her home from
foreclosure. The note securing the loan was assigned to the
Bank of New York in September 2002;; two months after the
EDQN KDG EHJXQ LWV IRUHFORVXUH DFWLRQ  0V 3DOPHU·V DWWRUQH\
argued that since the bank did not own the note at the time it
started its foreclosure action, it did not have standing to
foreclose. Rather than risk an adverse ruling, the bank settled
with Ms. Palmer by reducing the balance of her mortgage from

51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Tyler Cowen, Three Rocky Roads To a Bank Rescue, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 1, 2009, at BU5 (summarizing the capital problems which the banks
and taxpayers are facing).
54. See, e.g., In re Foreclosure Cases, No. 07CV2282, 2007 WL 3232430
(N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2007) (dismissing several foreclosure actions where
owners failed to follow the recording requirements of Ohio law). See also
Morgenson, supra note 11 (discussing court decisions enforcing the mortgage
recording requirement).
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$100,000 to $59,000.55
Suzanne Garcia and I have written on the subject of
standing under New York law.56 Without repeating here the
case summaries discussed elsewhere, it should be noted that in
cases decided since the publication of our respective articles,
the courts have held that lenders who succeed to ownership of
a mortgage by assignment that is recorded after the lender
initiated a foreclosure action (a retroactive assignment) lack
standing to foreclose.57 One court has asked a lender to explain
why it purchased a non-performing loan.58 Securitization
begets confusion even within the same lender. While the
OHQGHU·V ULJKW KDQG ZDV QHJRWLDWLQJ D VHWWOHPHQW ZLWK WKH
ERUURZHU WKH OHQGHU·V OHIW KDQG ZDV EXV\ FRQGXFWLQJ D
IRUHFORVXUHVDOH7KHFRXUWIRXQGWKHEDQNFRXQVHO·VFRQGXFWLQ
bringing a motion for default judgment to have been
´XQFRQVFLRQDEOH GLVKRQRUDEOH DQG XQSURIHVVLRQDOµ59 How
ZRXOG \RX OLNH WR EH LQ WKDW FRXQVHO·V VKRHV WKH QH[W WLPH KH
appears before that judge?
Securitization was undoubtedly a major contributor to the
air that expanded the real estate bubble over the last few
years. When the bubble burst, securitization having run amok
ZDVRQHRIWKHPDMRUFDXVHVRIWKHEXEEOH·VVXGGHQDQGDEUXSW
destruction. It will take years to fully understand and recover
from the impact that securitization had on the bubble and, as
we shall soon see, also upon the world economy.
IV. Globalization
+HUH´JOREDOL]DWLRQµUHIHUVWRWKHVSUHDGRIGHEW, which is
55. Morgenson, supra note 45.
56. Suzanne M. Garcia, A New Perspective on Foreclosure in Title, N.Y.
L.J., Aug. 25, 2008, at S4. See also Marvin N. Bagwell, Judges Take Notice of
Subprime Mortgage Crisis, N.Y. REAL EST. L. REP., Apr. 2008, at 1;; Marvin N.
Bagwell, Home Equity Theft Prevention Act, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 9, 2008, at 5.
57. See Washington Mut. Bank v. Patterson, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 7, 2009, at
29 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 15, 2008);; New Century Mortgage Corp. v. Durden,
N.Y. L.J., Feb. 11, 2009, at 27 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 2, 2009).
58. 'HXWVFKH%DQN1DW·O7UXVW&RY&DPSEHOON.Y. L.J., Dec. 24, 2008,
at 27 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 16, 2008).
59. 'HXWVFKH%DQN1DW·O7Uust Co. v. Miele, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 22, 2008, at
19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 5, 2008).
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created in the United States, across international borders. A
home mortgage secured by real estate located in Fort Myers,
Florida could end up on the books of a bank based in Oslo,
Norway. In reality, the Oslo bank purchases the CMO or CDO
that contains the Fort Myers mortgage as one of the thousands
therein, and records the security as an asset on its books.
Viewed this way, it is easy to see that globalization and
securitization go hand in hand. For example, just look at the
case headings cited in footnotes 57 and 58, supra.60 Like the
proverbial chicken and the egg, it is difficult to tell which came
first. However, it is very clear that if it were not for the
globalization of finance (and by finance, I mean borrowing and
OHQGLQJ  WKH $PHULFDQ PRUWJDJH ´FRQWDJLRQµ WKDW VSUHDG
around the world would have been contained within our very
own borders. Globalization therefore contributed to the air
that inflated the real estate bubble. The story is one of supply
and demand.
Let us start with an American household.
To cure the tech crash of 2000, the Federal Reserve Bank,
under the leadership of Alan Greenspan, kept American
interest rates relatively low. This, in turn, made money very
cheap.
At the same time, thanks to the securitization
pioneered by Wall Street, the mortgage lending business
transformed from a local business to one with access to
international funding. More money meant that more and more
people had the opportunity to borrow. The fact that Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac were on a mission, spreading
homeownership as much as possible, added nourishment to the
contagion. When you add the perception that the value of
American housing had never declined, the atmosphere becomes
even headier. Sure of ever-increasing home values, Americans
started to view their homes as ATM machines. As home prices
go up, more equity is created, which people can borrow
against³and they do so. Households then use their cashed-out
equity to buy things, especially plasma televisions and other
toys made in China and other low wage countries, for both
children and adults. $PHULFDQV KDYH DOVR ERXJKW ELJ 689·V
which use oil³lots of oil³imported from places like Saudi
60. See supra notes 57 & 58 and accompanying text.
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Arabia, Russia and Venezuela. To pay for these things, we
send our dollars there. To keep the dollars coming, these
countries buy our debt, issued by the Treasury Department as
well as Fannie and Freddie. The money from this debt is then
re-circulated back into our economy so that we can buy more
toys. The increase in the supply of money leads to an increase
in the demand of goods. To maintain demand, and to keep
their economies growing, foreign nations continued to supply
funding to the American economy so that Americans could buy
more of their goods.61 ,WZDVDVLI6LU(OWRQ-RKQ·VCircle of Life
had left the Lion King behind on the Broadway stage and
headed for the international economy, which indeed, is exactly
what happened.
For their part, the banks did two major things: (1) they
securitized the mortgages that American households had used
for the cash to buy goods and invest in more property because
real estate prices were only going up, and (2) they sold those
securities to banks and institutions throughout the world.
Hence, the globalization of American homeowner borrowing
resulted. Those who bought these securities wanted greater
returns, so the bankers and the mortgage lenders who supplied
them invented ways to increase the return. Thus, subprime
mortgages and adjustable rate mortgages were born. And to
further increase the supply of mortgages, lenders created their
SURJHQ\ ´QR-GRFVµ QR LQFRPH YHULILFDWLRQ ORDQV  VR-called
´QLQMD ORDQVµ QR LQFRPH QR MRE QR DVVHWV  ´H[SORGLQJ ORDQVµ
(loans where the interest rate adjusted rapidly and
VXUSULVLQJO\ XSZDUGV  DQG OLDU·V ORDQV QR QRWKLQJ 62 It is no
wonder that Time magazine named Angelo Mozilo, the founder
of Countrywide Financial (now Bank of America Home Loans),
one of the major subprime purveyors, as the number one
person to blame for the economic meltdown.63 So returns went
up for investors, and, after seeing the outsized returns, more
investors wanted in. To increase their returns, many investors

61. See Neall Ferguson, Reasons to Worry, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2006, § 6
(Magazine), at 46.
62. See Jack Rosenthal, On Language, No Docs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17,
2008, § MM (Magazine), at 18 (providing a glossary of subprime mortgage
terms).
63. Gibbs, supra note 4, at 21.
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resorted to borrowing money to leverage their investments.
They made $100 million bets with only $1 million
of their own money and $99 million in debt. If
the value of the investment rose to just $101
million, the investors would double their money.
...
If that $100 million investment . . . were to lose
just $1 million of its value, the investor who put
up only $1 million would lose everything.64
Professor Blinder regards permitting sky-high leveraging, such
as in the aforementioned example, as one of the six blunders
made by regulators that contributed to the current financial
crisis,65 but more on this later.
Securities based upon
mortgages made in the United States found their way into the
investment coffers of banks, pension funds, municipalities, and
governments throughout the world. Then the contagion hit.
Many commentators believe that the seminal event was the
7UHDVXU\·V GHFLVLRQ WR OHW /HKPDQ %URWKHUV IDLO DQG HQWHU
bankruptcy.66 This forced the holder of mortgage-backed
securities to see exactly what they had purchased. To their
horror, they discovered that their formerly valuable CMO and
CDO asset holdings were based upon subprime mortgages or
worse. As noted above in the section on securitization, the
UDWLQJ DJHQFLHV· UDWLQJV ZHUH PHDQLQJOHVV DQG the insurance
provided by AIG was suspect since AIG only had billions in
capital to pay trillions of dollars in possible claims.67 The giant
Swiss bank, UBS, thought to be one of the most conservative
and careful investors in the world, found itself holding $80
billion in U.S. mortgage-backed securities on which it, by late
2007, had suffered a $37 billion loss with an additional $30
billion waiting to be recognized. Its shareholders lost one half
of the value of their stock and its chairman lost his job.68
64. David Leonhardt, &DQ·W *UDVS &UHGLW &ULVLV" -RLQ WKH &OXE, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2008, at A1.
65. Blinder, supra note 43.
66. Id.
67. See discussion supra Part III.
68. Nelson D. Schwartz, The Mortgage Bust Goes Global, N.Y. TIMES,
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The contagion continues to spread.69
Governments,
including those based in London, Berlin, Dublin, Amsterdam,
and Brussels, have had to seize major banks and lenders.70
Essentially, the governments had to seize or pump funds into
banks because the losses that the banks experienced from their
bad investments in American mortgage-back securities wiped
out their capital. The banks became the walking dead³
´]RPELHVµ³unable to lend or borrow.71 Without access to
credit, neither consumers nor businesses can obtain funds to
buy goods or to expand. The Troubled Asset Recovery Program
´7$53µ  LQLWLDWHG E\ WKH %XVK $GPLQLVWUDWLRQ LQ 6HSWHPEHU
 ZDV PHDQW WR UHSOHQLVK WKH EDQNV· FDSLWDO VR WKDW WKH\
would start lending again. It is obvious from the daily
headlines that TARP did not work.72
Currently, both
nationally and worldwide, we are experiencing no growth or
actual falling economies. That is, by definition, a financial
crisis. And it all started with home mortgages, the payment on
which people could not make. But as we have seen, and will
continue to see throughout this Article, the fault does not
necessarily lie with the borrowers. As Time PDJD]LQH·VOLVWRI
twenty-five indicates,73 there is enough blame to go around.74
The bursting of the real estate bubble in the United States
PHDQWWKDWWKHFRQVXPHUV·$70VKDGUXQGU\:LWKQRFDVKWR
spend, the demand for goods by consumers in the United States
plummeted. As a result of the lack of demand for goods in
$PHULFD·V UHFHVVLRQDU\ HFRQomy, China estimates that 20
million of its 130 million migrant workers are now
unemployed.75 According to the United Nations, 50 million
people throughout the world could lose their jobs by the end of

Apr. 6, 2008, at B1.
69. Mark Landler, The U.S. Financial Crisis Is Spreading to Europe,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2008, at C1.
70. Id.
71. Paul Krugman, Banking on the Brink, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at
A27.
72. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Bailout Needs Some Strings Attached
to Limit Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2009, at BU1.
73. Gibbs, supra note 4, at 21.
74. See Bagwell, supra note 2, at 3.
75. Keith Bradsher, &KLQD·V 8QHPSOR\PHQW 6ZHOOV DV ([SRUWV )DOWHU,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2009, at B4.
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2009 because of the recession that began in the United States.76
Both Russia and China, two nations that invested heavily in
American debt, have blamed the United States for their
financial crisis.77 These accusations could have been meant as
propaganda to play for the audiences at home, but the Chinese
and Russian people are beginning to suffer. The American
economic crisis has affected Russian used car dealers in specific
ways.78 'HDOHUV LQ 9ODGLYRVWRN D FLW\ RQ 5XVVLD·V HDVWHUQ
IURQWLHU URVH XS LQ SURWHVWV DJDLQVW WKH JRYHUQPHQW·V
imposition of tariffs against foreign cars.79 Russia raised tariffs
to protect its foreign currency reserves, which are being
drained by (1) a fall in the demand for oil;; and (2) a run on the
ruble, which was caused by its own hard times that the
Kremlin believes were brought on by the American financial
crisis.80 7KH IHDUHG SHRSOH·V SURWHVW WKDW SRVHV WKH ELJJHVW
threat to the Putin regime may be attributed to the
international financial crisis, brought on by the bursting of the
American real estate bubble.
The global economic instability brought on by the
American recession, which in turn finds its roots in the
bursting of our real estate bubble, poses the top threat to our
own national security, even outpacing terrorism, according to
Dennis C. Blair, the American Director of National
Intelligence.81 In testimony before Congress, Mr. Blair stated
WKDW´>W@KHFULVLV>WKDW@VWDUWHGLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVKDV
[already] increased questioning of U.S. stewardship of the
global economy.µ82 Not only was the globalization of American
mortgage debt a part of the air that inflated the real estate
76. Nelson D. Schwartz, Unemployment Surges Around the World,
Threatening Stability, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2009, at A1.
77. Carter Dougherty & Katrin Bennhold, Russia and China Blame
Capitalist, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2009, at A21.
78. Clifford J. Levy, Rash of Tariff Protests in Vladivostok Has the
Kremlin on the Defensive, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2009, at A6.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Mark Mazzetti, Global Economic Crisis Poses Top Threat to U.S.,
Spy Chief Warns, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at A14.
82. S. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 111TH CONG., ANNUAL THREAT
ASSESSMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 3 (Feb. 12, 2009) (statement for
the
record
of
Admiral
Dennis
C.
Blair),
available
at
http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20090212_testimony.pdf.
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bubble, it was also part and parcel of what ultimately caused
the bubble to burst. That which American borrowers and
lenders, as well as international investors, spread throughout
the world may return to exact no small measure of restitution
and, dare I say, retribution.
V. Speculation
´6SHFXODWLRQµ LV GHILQHG DV WKH ´HQJDJHPHQW LQ EXVLQHVV
transactions involving considerable risk but offering the chance
of large gains, [especially] trading in commodities, stocks, etc.,
LQWKHKRSHRISURILWIURPFKDQJHVLQWKHPDUNHWSULFHµ83 Every
financial bubble involves some form of speculation³that is,
taking great risks in the hope of obtaining great profits. I have
already discussed some forms of speculation in this Article.
For example, homeowners who engaged in seriatim borrowing
against the equity in their homes were speculating that the
values of their homes would continue to rise. The banks that
used leveraging, that is, the use of borrowed money to magnify
gains, such as the hypothetical investor discussed earlier who
borrowed $100 million to increase the profit on their $1 million
investment, are speculators.84
No discussion of financial speculation can begin without
taking note of the tulip mania that gripped Holland in the
seventeenth century. Mark Frankel, in his review of Mike
'DVK·VERRN7XOLSRPDQLD7KH6WRU\RIWKH:RUOG·V0RVW
Coveted Flower & The Extraordinary Passions It Aroused, tells
the story.85 Tulips had been prized since the mid-1550s for
their extraordinary beauty, purity and sharpness of colors, and
extravagant presentation.86 The fact that it took seven years to
grow a tulip from seed to bulb only added to its allure.87 By the
beginning of the seventeenth century, Holland was at the peak
83. Dictionary.com,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/speculation
(last visited Sept. 6, 2009).
84. See Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., All Fall Down, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
26, 2008, at A33 (providing a biting critique of speculation by a lender).
85. Mark Frankel, When the Tulip Bubble Burst, BUSINESSWEEK, Apr.
24,
2000,
available
at
http://www.businessweek.com/2000/00_17/b3678084.htm.
86. See MIKE DASH, TULIPOMANIA 27-35 (1999).
87. Id. at 56.
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of its power, with the merchants in Amsterdam making 400%
profits on their East Indies trading.88 These wealthy Dutch
displayed their riches by building grand estates surrounded by
elaborate flower gardens that featured rare and exquisite
tulips.89 In 1624, a man in Amsterdam who owned the only
twelve bulbs of a midnight blue tulip topped by a band of pure
white and accented by crimson flares was offered as high as
3,000 guilders for one bulb.90 By comparison, Rembrandt
received only half that amount when he painted his
Prices rose steadily
masterpiece, the Night Watch.91
throughout the 1630s and speculators entered the marketplace.
In the winter of 1636-37, one rare tulip bulb that was about to
split in two was sold at auction for 5,200 guilders.92 Some
bulbs were changing hands in the marketplace ten times a
day.93 Then came the crash. All it took was one buyer in
Haarlem who refused to pay for a bulb that he had purchased
at auction.94 Panic struck, and within days, the marketplace
had all but vanished. Bulbs, which had routinely commanded
5,000 guilders days before, began to trade for fifty guilders.95
Great fortunes evaporated overnight.96
The tulip mania story is so evocative because every
financial bubble since has followed the same course. I could
substitute railroad stocks for tulips and end up with a similar
description of the mid-nineteenth century collapse in the
market for railroad securities;; substitute stocks, and I could
describe what happened in 1929;; substitute VKDUHVLQ´GRWFRPµ
companies, and we end up with the dot.com bust of the late
1990s. Today, we read the story of the real estate bubble, and
´0F0DQVLRQVµDQG´IOLSSLQJµFRPHWRPLQG6FKRODUVFDQSRLQW
out differences among the financial speculations involved in
HDFK EXEEOH·V EXUVWLng, but because human nature has
remained virtually unchanged over the centuries, the
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 71.
Id. at 78-79.
Id. at 82.
Id. at x.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 156.
Id. at 162-63.
Id. at 165.
Frankel, supra note 85.
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framework remains the same.
More recently, in 2007, the marketplace for commercial
real estate was at its highest. Sam Zell, a billionaire real
estate investor based in Chicago sold 573 commercial
properties located throughout the United States to the
Blackstone Group for $39 billion.97 %ODFNVWRQH ´LPPHGLDWHO\
flipped hundreds of those building [to sixteen different groups]
IRU  ELOOLRQµ98 It was promoted as the deal of the century,
and unfortunately for all involved, it may have been. Charles
V. Bagli of the New York Times wrote that,
[t]oday, the wreckage of those purchases is
strewn across the country, from Southern
California to Austin, Texas, to Chicago to New
York. Many of the [sixteen] companies that
ERXJKW >6DP =HOO·V SURSHUWLHV@ DUH QRZ VWXFN
with punishing debt, properties whose values are
plummeting and millions of feet of office space
they cannot fill.99
Mr. Bagli then goes oQDWOHQJWKGHVFULELQJKRZWKH´GHDORIWKH
FHQWXU\µ GHVWUR\HG DOPRVW HYHU\FRPSDQ\ ZKR LQYHVWHG DW WKH
top of the market.100 One of the buyers was the legendary New
York real estate mogul Harry Macklowe, who purchased seven
buildings from Blackstone.101 Macklowe and his family put
down only $50 million of their personal fortune and leveraged
it into $7 billion in short term, high-interest debt in order to
finance the acquisitions.102 Within two years, because of the
bursting real estate bubble, Macklowe was forced to turn over
several of the buildings to his lenders.103 The lenders then
turned around and sold those buildings for 25% less than what

97. Charles V. Bagli, 6DP=HOO·V(PSLUH8QGHUZDWHULQD%LJ:D\, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2009, at B1.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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Macklowe had originally paid for them.104 %RWKWKH´OHYHUDJHHµ
DQG WKH ´OHYHUDJRUµ ORVW VSHFWDFXODUO\  ,Q RUGHU WR avoid
personal bankruptcy and other defaults, Macklowe was also
IRUFHGWRVHOOWKHIDPLO\·VFURZQMHZHOWKH*0%XLOGLQJZKLFK
it had acquired in 2003.105 Macklowe, a well-known and
admired risk-taker, had speculated and lost.
Speculation by consumers added to the real estate bubble.
Hannah Fairfield of the New York Times wrote, ´RYHUEXLOGLQJ
in regions of Florida, California and other states with housing
bubbles lured overeager residents to become speculators,
buying up many homes with the expectation that their value
ZRXOG ULVHµ106 Florida has been the national poster child for
consumer speculation. In Lehigh Acres, a suburb of Fort
0\HUV ´IURP  WR WKH HQG RI  GHYHORSHUV FRPSOHWHG
13,183 units . . . , nearly doubling the total stock of 15,216 that
H[LVWHG LQ µ107 As a result, housing prices doubled and
then tripled.108 ´6RPHWLPHV KRXVHV ZRXOG VHOO WKUHH RU IRXU
WLPHV LQ D IHZ PRQWKV DQG QR RQH ZRXOG PRYH LQ    µ109
6SHFXODWLRQ DQG WKH ´IOLSSLQJµ WKDW DFFRPSDQLHV LW were
rampant. Then, in 2007, it all went away³the bubble had
burst.110 Perhaps George Packer, in his article, The Ponzi
6WDWH )ORULGD·V )RUHFORVXUH 'LVDVWHU, offered the best
description of the real estate speculative fever that gripped
Florida and its aftermath.111
In his article, Mr. Packer takes the reader on a journey
along State Road 54 in Pasco County, Florida³a road running

104. Id.
105. Charles V. Bagli, Macklowes Sell G.M. Building for $2.9 Billion,
N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2008, at A27.
106. Hannah Fairfield, In the Shadow of Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
6,
2008,
at
N4,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/06/business/06metricstext.html. The chart
accompanying the article that illustrates subprime mortgages as a
percentage of all mortgages is especially edifying.
107. Damien Cave, )ORULGD·V &URVVURDGV RI )RUHFORVXUH DQG 'HVSDLU,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2009, at A1.
108. Id.
109. Id. (quoting Bob Elliot).
110. Id.
111. George Packer, 7KH 3RQ]L 6WDWH )ORULGD·V )RUHFORVXUH 'LVDVWHU,
NEW YORKER, Feb. 9 & 16, 2009, at 81.
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forty-five minutes northeast of Tampa.112 In 1950, twenty
WKRXVDQGSHRSOHOLYHGLQ3DVFR&RXQW\%\WKHFRXQW\·V
population had grown to half a million residents.113 Over the
past few years, around one thousand people a day moved to
Florida.114 This population growth fueled a real estate boom
WKDWZDV´ELJJHUDQGJDXGLHUWKDQDQ\WKLQJWKHVWDWHKDGHYHU
VHHQµ115 Flat and desolate fields became housing developments
RI ´ORRN-alike two-VWRU\ EHLJH DQG \HOORZ KRXVHVµ WKDW VROG IRU
two to three hundred thousand dollars.116 The homes in turn
OHGWR´VKRSSLQJPDOOVDQGPHJD-FKXUFKHVµEXWE\LWZDV
all over.117 7KHGHYHORSPHQWVKDGEHFRPH´JKRVWVXEGLYLVLRQVµ
full of houses in which no one lived because the growth was all
a mirage³fueled by the perception of future growth.118 In the
words of Gary Mormino, a professor of history at the University
RI 6RXWK )ORULGD ´)ORULGD LQ VRPH ZD\V UHVHPEOHV D PRGHUQ
Ponzi scheme. Everything is fine for me if a thousand
newcomers come tomorrow. The problem is, except for a few
road bumps³· ¶ DQG WKH\ ZHUH UHDOO\ PLQRU³no one
NQHZ ZKDW ZRXOG KDSSHQ LI WKH\ VWRSSHG FRPLQJµ119 In a
description that is destined to become classic, Mr. Packer notes
WKDW´>E\@WKHKRXVLQJPDUNHWLQ)ORULGDZDVKRWWHUWKDQ
LWKDGHYHUEHHQDQGIUHQ]\VSUHDGDFURVVDOOOHYHOVRIVRFLHW\µ
120 Many of the migrant farm workers from the area were able
to find jobs in the construction industry, working as roofers and
drywall hangers.121
Nearly everyone you met around Tampa had a
5HDOWRU·V OLFHQVH RU D EURNHU·V OLFHQVH RU ZDV D
title agent. $OH[6LQNWKHVWDWH·VFKLHIILQDQFLDO
RIILFHU DQG D 'HPRFUDW VDLG ´When the
\DUGPDQ FRPHV DQG VD\V KH·V QRW JRLQJ WR PRZ
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 83 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 84.
Id.
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\RXU\DUGDQ\PRUHEHFDXVHKH·VJRLQJWREHFRPH
a mortgage broker, that is a sure sign that
VRPHWKLQJLVZURQJµ122
The process of flipping houses and condominiums became an
amateur pursuit for those in the middle-class.123 ´3HRSOH ZKR
drew modest salaries at their jobs not only owned a house, but
bought other houses as speculators, the way average
$PHULFDQVHOVHZKHUHGDEEOHLQGD\WUDGLQJµ124 It was destined
not to end well.
Packer goes on LQ KLV DUWLFOH WR GLVFXVV WKH ´GRZQZDUG
VSLUDOµRIWKH)ORULGDPDUNHWQRWLQJ
:KHQ DW WKH )ORULGD·V PDUNHW·V GL]]\LQJ PLG-
decade height, speculators lost confidence, the
faith that kept the state aloft gave way and the
economy plummeted like a Looney Tunes
character who, suspended in midair, suddenly
looks down. Property values did what the lender
and borrowers somehow never imagined was
possible: they started to decline. Today, the
average unit in Fort Myers and Cape Coral is
selling for just a hundred and fifty-eight
thousand dollars, less than half of what it sold
for at the height.125
The Wall Street Journal UHSRUWHGWKDW´WZR\HDUVDJRWKH/HH
County court system [which covers Fort Myers and Coral
Grove] had about 1,900 foreclosure cases on the books. That
QXPEHU VZHOOHG WR  E\ WKH EHJLQQLQJ RI >@µ126 The
average time that it takes a judge to dispose of a case? Fifteen
seconds.127
Speculation, if dabbled in here and there, is not bad. Its
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 88.
126. Michael Corkery, $ )ORULGD &RXUW·V ´5RFNHW 'RFNHWµ %ODVW 7KURXJK
Foreclosure Cases, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2009, at A1.
127. Id.
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use is driven by the desire to make a profit, a concept that is at
the core of capitalism. However, it is when speculation runs
amok, and people or institutions begin to speculate with other
SHRSOH·VPRQH\WKDWVRFLHW\KDVDELJSUREOHP³a problem that
usually results in financial ruin for those who come late into
the game or at the height of the market. Of course, as both Mr.
Packer and the Wall Street Journal observe, not all people who
are being foreclosed out of their homes are speculators.128 Most
are innocent people who have suffered a misfortune, such as a
job loss, medical ailment, or some other personal setback that
has deprived them of their income and thus, the ability to meet
their monthly mortgage payments. The true speculators,
especially the scoundrels, are long gone, and they took their
profits with them. Whether the bubble surrounds tulips,
railroad bonds, stock certificates, dot.com companies, or real
estate, speculation inflates the bubble, and then it bursts.
Unlike Wile E. Coyote, Sylvester the Cat, or Daffy Duck, the
person holding the Acme anvil might not survive the fall.
VI. Regulation
About a century ago, Mark Twain commented that money
LVQRWWKHURRWRIDOOHYLOEXWUDWKHU´WKHODFNRIPRQH\LVWKH
URRW RI DOO HYLOµ129 In the case of our current financial crisis,
experts agree that it was not regulation, but the lack thereof
that permitted securitization, speculation, and the side effects
RI JOREDOL]DWLRQ WR FUHDWH WKH FLUFXPVWDQFHV OHDGLQJ WR WRGD\·V
financial crises. The real estate bubble³more properly, the
bursting of the bubble³is the parent of the crisis. In this
context, the lack of regulation enabled the progeny³the
financial crisis³to come into being.
As discussed earlier in this Article, Time magazine
recently listed the twenty-five people to blame for the financial
meltdown.130 Of the twenty-five people who made the list,
almost one-quarter were in a position to regulate the financial
marketplace. A review of those six individuals places the

128. Id.;; Packer, supra note 111.
129. THE WIT AND WISDOM OF MARK TWAIN (Paul Negri ed., 1999).
130. Gibbs, supra note 4, at 20.
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apparent fruits of deregulation into historical context. Number
two on the list, former Senator Phil Gramm, was Chairman of
the Senate Banking Committee from 1995 through 2000.131
*UDPPZDVDQ´RXWVSRNHQFKDPSLRQRIILQDQFLDOGHUHJXODWLRQ
He played a leading role in . . . the 1999 repeal of the Glass-
Steagall Act,132 which separated commercial banks from Wall
6WUHHW>LQYHVWPHQWEDQNV@µ133 This led to the creation of major
financial institutions such as Citicorp, which, in trying to be all
things to all lenders and borrowers, accrued huge losses and
then had to be bailed out by the Treasury Department.134
Gramm is also responsible for a provision in the 2000
Commodity Futures Act135 that exempted derivatives-like
credit default swaps from regulation.136 Senator Gramm takes
issue with his having any blame for the financial crisis.137 In
his Op-Ed piece for the Wall Street Journal, he blames the
´SROLWLFL]DWLRQµ RI PRUWJDJH OHQGHUV DV H[HPSOLILHG E\ WKH
Community Reinvestment Act,138 ZKLFK ´OHG UHJXODWRUV WR
foster looser underwriting and encouraged the making of more
DQG PRUH PDUJLQDO ORDQVµ DQG WKH  +RXVLQJ %LOO ZKLFK
´VHWTXRWDVRU¶WDUJHWV·WKDW)DQQLHDQG)UHGGLHZHUHWRDFKLHYH
in meeting the housing needs of low and moderate income
$PHULFDQVµ DV WKH ´SULPDU\ FDXVH RI WKLV FULVLVµ139 However,
months earlier, in the Op-Ed pages of that very same
newspaper, Thomas Frank published an article predicting that
conservatives would blame Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae for
131. Id.
132. Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall), ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162, repealed
by Gramm-Leach-Bliley, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified
in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
133. Gibbs, supra note 4, at 20 (internal footnote added).
134. See, e.g., David Enrich et al., U.S. Agrees to Rescue Struggling
Citigroup, WALL ST. J1RYDW$ ´7KHIHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQWDJUHHG
Sunday night to rescue Citigroup Inc. by helping to absorb potentially
hundreds of billions of dollars in losses on toxic assets on its balance sheet . . .
µ 
135. Commodities Futures Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, §
1(a)(5), 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).
136. Gibbs, supra note 4, at 20.
137. Phil Gramm, Op-Ed., Deregulation and the Financial Panic, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 20, 2009, at A17.
138. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat.
1111 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908 (2006)).
139. Gramm, supra note 137.
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causing the crLVLV EHFDXVH WKH\ IRU ´SROLWLFDO UHDVRQVµ ZHUH
required to buy bad mortgages taken out by people who could
not pay.140 Instead, Frank, quoting Bill Black, a professor of
economics and law at the University of Missouri-Kansas City,
DVVLJQV WKH EODPH WR ´IRur entities that under conservative
economic theory should have exercised effective market
discipline³the appraisers, the originators of the mortgages,
the rating agencies, and the investment banking firms that
packaged the subprime mortgage-backed securitLHVµ141
Bill Clinton is number thirteen on Time·V list.142 As
President, he signed both the repeal of Glass-Steagall and the
2000 Commodity Futures Act into law.143 Clinton also loosened
housing lending rules which had the perverse, unintended side
effect of creating subprime mortgages.144 Number fourteen,
*HRUJH : %XVK ´HPEUDFHG GHUHJXODWLRQ DQG DOORZHG IHGHUDO
oversight agencies to ease off of banks and mortgage
Number four, Christopher Cox, head of the
EURNHUVµ145
6HFXULWLHV DQG ([FKDQJH &RPPLVVLRQ ´6(&µ , oversaw the
massive leveraging by banks and failed to rein in the risks
undertaken by investment banks such as Bear Stearns,
Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch.146 Time believes that
Cox deserves so much of the blame, that in a subsequent
edition, it devoted an entire column to his failures, noting that
KH ZDV D ´FUXFLDO YRLFH >WKDW@ ZDV PLVVLQJµ ´DEVHQWµ D ´QR
VKRZµ DQG ´DVOHHS RQ WKH MREµ³and that was just in the
DUWLFOH·V ILUVW WKUHH SDUDJUDSKV147 Number two on the list is
Alan Greenspan, who as head of the Federal Reserve,
permitted low interest rates to persist for far too long, and
ZKRVH ´ORQJ-standing disdain for regulation underpinned the
PRUWJDJHFULVLVµ148 *UHHQVSDQDOVRDGPLWWHGWR&RQJUHVV´WKDW
140. Thomas Frank, Op-Ed., The Tilting Yard: The GOP Blames the
Victim, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2008, at A23.
141. Id.
142. Gibbs, supra note 4.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Adam Zagorin & Michael Weisskoff, Inside the Breakdown at the
SEC, TIME, Mar. 9, 2009, at 34.
148. Gibbs, supra note 4, at 20;; see also Floyd Norris, Failing Upward at
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he made a mistake in presuming that financial firms would
UHJXODWH WKHPVHOYHVµ149 Finally, former Treasury Secretary
Hank Paulson appears as number five on the list because he
responded ´WRRODWHLQEDWWOLQJWKHFULVLVµ150
It should be noted that Time·VOLVWDOVRLQFOXGHVWKHIRUPHU
head of one federal governmental institution, which it turns
out should have been regulated much more tightly. Franklin
Raines, number nine on Time·s list, became the head of Fannie
Mae in 1999.151 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, its smaller
brother, are federally chartered financial institutions, charged
with providing liquidity to the housing marketplace by
purchasing mortgages from lenders.152 In effect, Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac are dominant purchasers, and thereby
lenders, in the secondary marketplace. After staggering losses,
the Federal Government seized both entities in September
2008.153 Franklin Raines left Fannie Mae in 2004 as the result
of an accounting scandal, just as it was making massive
investments in subprime mortgages and securities, both of
which went south.154 Congressional hearings on the failure of
both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac disclosed that they had
spent over $175 million in lobbying fees over ten years
precisely to avoid greater regulation.155 In 2008, Fannie Mae
had a loss of $58.7 billion, an amounW WKDW ´H[FHHG>HG@ LWV QHW
LQFRPH IRU WKH SUHFHGLQJ  \HDUVµ156 Both Fannie Mae and
)UHGGLH 0DF DUH H[SHFWHG WR ´JXVK >UHG LQN@ LQ HYHQ ODUJHU
TXDQWLWLHVµ EHFDXVH RI PRUWJDJH GHIDXOWV DQG ORVVHV LQ WKH
the Fed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2009, at B1 (providing an in-depth criticism of
$ODQ*UHHQVSDQDQGWKH)HGHUDO5HVHUYH·VIDLOXUHVZKLFKOHGWRWKH current
financial crisis).
149. Gibbs, supra note 4, at 20 (internal quotations omitted).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See Stephen Labaton & Edmund L. Andrews, In Rescue to Stabilize
Lending, U.S. Takes Over Mortgage Finance Titans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7,
2008, at A1 (discussing the Bush DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ·VEDLORXWRI)DQQLH0DHDQG
Freddie Mac).
153. Id.
154. Gibbs, supra note 4, at 20.
155. Lynnley Browning, Ex-2IILFHU)DXOWV0RUWJDJH*LDQWVIRU´2UJ\µRI
Nonprime Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2008, at B3.
156. James R. Hagerty & Damian Paletta, Red Ink Clouds Role of
Fannie, Freddie, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2009, at A2.
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value of their derivative contracts.157 As for Congress, there is
a saying about those who live in glass houses that comes to
mind.
Another regulator·V IDLOXUH to regulate recently came to
light. In July 2008, the Treasury seized IndyMac Federal
%DQN )6% ´,QG\0DFµ  LQ WKH WKLUG ODUJHVW EDQN IDLOXUH HYHU
recorded.158 At the time of its failure, IndyMac had $32 billion
in assets and $19 billion in deposits.159 IndyMac had pursued
an overly aggressive growth strategy that included failing to
YHULI\ERUURZHUV·LQFRPHVDQGUHO\LQJRQH[SHQVLYHGHSRVLWVWR
fund its operations.160 7KH 7UHDVXU\ 'HSDUWPHQW·V LQVSHFWRU
JHQHUDO VDLG WKDW WKH 2IILFH RI 7KULIW 6XSHUYLVLRQ ´276µ 
ZKLFK ZDV FKDUJHG ZLWK UHJXODWLQJ ,QG\0DF ´GLG QRW WDNH
aggressive action to stop those practices from continuing to
SUROLIHUDWHµ161 OTS recognized the red flags which had come
up, but, at the time, did nothing to address them.162
Economists from the left, the middle and the right agree
that regulators, particularly Alan Greenspan and the Federal
Reserve, share the blame for the real estate bubble.163 The
New York Times TXRWHV *HUDOG 3 2·'ULVFROO -U, of the
libertarian Cato Institute, DV VD\LQJ ´>WKH )HGHUDO 5HVHUYH@
DOORZHGWKHVHDEVROXWHO\LQVDQHEXEEOHVWRKDSSHQµ164 Charles
W. Calomiris of the conservative American Enterprise Institute
VDLG´>w]e do need some regulation-VPDUWHUUHJXODWLRQµ165 As
noted previously, Alan S. Blinder of Princeton University has
written that the people in power made six errors which, had
they avoided, would have evaded the financial crisis.166 Those
157. Id.
158. Louise Story, Regulators Seize Mortgage Lender, N.Y. TIMES, July
12, 2008, at C5.
159. Reuters, Indy Mac Files for Bankruptcy Protection, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug.
2,
2008,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/02/business/02lender.html.
160. Michael R. Crittenden, Regulators Missed Woes at Indy Mac, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 27, 2009, at A2.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Abha Bhattarai, Economists Plumb the Depths of the Downturn,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2008, at C3.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Blinder, supra note 43.
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errors have permitWHG ´ZLOG GHULYDWLYHVµ ´VN\-KLJK OHYHUDJHµ
´DVXESULPHVXUJHµ´ILGGOLQJRQIRUHFORVXUHVµ´OHWWLQJ/HKPDQ
JRµ DQG WKH ´7$53·V GHWRXUµ167 Robert J. Shiller, a professor
of economics and finance at <DOH8QLYHUVLW\QRWLQJWKDW´$ODQ
Greenspan . . . acknowledged in a Congressional hearing . . .
WKDW KH KDG PDGH DQ ¶HUURU· LQ DVVXPLQJ WKDW WKH PDUNHWV
would properly regulate themselves, and . . . that he had no
LGHDDILQDQFLDOGLVDVWHUZDVLQWKHPDNLQJµZURWHWKDW´ORWVRI
people were worried about the housing boom[, but]. . . the Fed
GLGQRWWDNHWKHPYHU\VHULRXVO\µ168
The experts do not spare the SEC either. Michael Lewis,
the author of /LDU·V 3RNHU,169 and David Einhorn, co-author of
Fooling Some of the People All of the Time,170 in discussing the
rating agencies, wrote WKDW ´>R@YHU WKH ODVW  \HDUV $PHULFDQ
financial institutions have taken on more and more risk, with
WKHEOHVVLQJRIUHJXODWRUVµ171 Further, although the SEC
ZDV´>F@UHDWHGWRSURWHFWLQYHVWRUVIURPILQDQFLal predators, the
commission has evolved into a mechanism for protecting
ILQDQFLDO SUHGDWRUV ZLWK SROLWLFDO FORXW IURP LQYHVWLJDWLRQµ172
Although the New York Times headline says it all³S.E.C.
Chief Pursues Reversal of Years of Lax Enforcement173³I will
quote some of the article anyway. The author stated:
Investor groups had been frozen out by an agency
dominated
by
commissioners
describing
themselves as proponents of free-market
principles, who made it more difficult for the
professional staff to bring cases. Senior jobs lay
vacant for many months. Many problems at the
largest investment houses had gone undetected,
167. Id.
168. Robert J. Shiller, Challenging the Crowd In Whispers, Not Shouts,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2008, at BU5.
169. LEWIS, supra note 3.
170. DAVID EINHORN & JOEL GREENBLATT, FOOLING SOME OF THE PEOPLE
ALL OF THE TIME (2008).
171. Michael Lewis & David Einhorn, The End of the Financial World As
We Know It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, at WK9.
172. Id.
173. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Chief Pursues Reversal of Years of Lax
Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2009, at B1.
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and tell tale signs or possible fraud at Bernard L.
Madoff Securities and at the Stanford Group,
which was accused last week of being involved in
an $8 billion investor fraud, were ignored.174
No discussion of the lack of regulation would be complete
without acknowledging the failure of regulators to curtail one
of the most pernicious financial inventions that contributed to
millions of Americans losing their homes³the subprime
PRUWJDJH  ´6XESULPHµ LV D FDWFKDOO WHUP ZKLFK GHVFULEHV
suspiciously cheap mortgages peddled to the elderly, first-time
homebuyers, and to those who were unwilling or unable to read
the small print. Adjustable-rate mortgaJHV ´$50sµ ³the
aforementioned liars loans, ninja loans, and no-doc loans³fall
within the subprime category. Almost all subprime mortgages
contain an ARM feature. The mortgages generally carry a low
teaser interest rate for an initial period. That rate normally
UHVHWVRU´H[SORGHVµZLWKLQ VL[PRQWKVWR WZR\HDUV WR DPXFK
higher interest rate, which effectively captures the interest and
profit lost by the lender during the initial period. Often, when
the interest rate resets, the monthly mortgage payment can
increase by up to 50%.175 This can be catastrophic for the
borrowers whose incomes are generally stretched to meet the
initial teaser rate payments.176 When subprime mortgages are
bundled, or packaged, together, and then sliced and diced into
tranches DQGVHFXULWL]HGWKH\RIWHQEHFRPH´WR[LFZDVWHµZLWK
death coming to all who invest in them.177 In the words of Jack
Rosenthal, the New York Times columnist, subprime mortgages
´UHIOHFW WKH GHFHLW F\QLFLVP DQG VFDQGDORXV H[SORLWDWLRQ WKDW
are taking the homes of many thousands, perhaps millions of
IDPLOLHVµ178
Why would people buy into a subprime mortgage? Often,
they are not told that the mortgage is subprime and carries an
adjustable rate. Then, when they find out, the borrowers are
174. Id.
175. Niall Ferguson, Reasons to Worry, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2006, § 6
(Magazine), at 46.
176. Id.
177. Rosenthal, supra note 62.
178. Id.

33

2009]

CAN·T LIVE WITHOUT AIR

213

also told that they can refinance into a lower rate mortgage
when the loan resets. Of course, if the borrower is a speculator,
then she assumes that the property secured by the mortgage
will be sold, and the mortgage paid off, before its interest rate
resets. Further, mortgage brokers, who originate 50% of all
mortgages, have an economic incentive to promote subprime
mortgages. Lenders often pay the mortgage brokers a fee,
FDOOHG D \LHOG VHUYLFH SUHPLXP ´<63µ  IRU SODFLQJ D ERUURZHU
into a subprime mortgage. YSPs are present in fully 90% of all
subprime mortgages, implying that brokers needlessly pushed
their clients into subprime mortgages for the YSP.179 Subprime
mortgages were not limited to the poor, elderly, or financially
untutored. A study conducted by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development shows that one-in-nine middle class
families and one-in-fourteen upper middle class families who
refinanced their mortgages were placed in a subprime loan.180
The problem for the economy and for many homeowners is
that when the interest rates on their subprime mortgages
reset, they could no longer afford their homes. As a result, they
either abandoned their homes or lost them through foreclosure.
*HRUJH3DFNHU·VWULSDORQJ6WDWH5RXWHQHDU7DPSD)ORULGD
and his visiWV WR WKH ´JKRVW VXEGLYLVLRQVµ DORQJ WKH URXWH
vividly illustrates the problem.181 Manny Fernandez wrote an
investigative report for the New York Times detailing what
occurred in a four block area in Jamaica, Queens County,
which had the highest foreclosure rate in New York State.182
Since 2004, thirty-nine homes in just that four block area went
into foreclosure.183 In the past five years, in southeast Queens,
226 foreclosures have been filed.184 In 2005 alone, 69% of the
homes purchased in the area were purchased with subprime
mortgages.185 The foreclosures basically turned what had been
an evolving middle-class neighborhood into a depressed area
179. Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer: The Case for Regulation,
HARV. MAG., May-June 2008, at 36.
180. Id.
181. Packer, supra note 111.
182. Manny Fernandez, Door to Door, Foreclosure Knocks Here, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at A33.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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with renewed drug activity, gangs, over-grown lots, and
abandoned or vandalized homes.
In short, people just
disappeared.186
For the regulators, the shame is that they knew that the
subprime debacle was coming well in advance, but they did
nothing to curtail its detonation. The real estate bubble is
generally thought to have burst in the late summer or fall of
2007. In June 2006, Niall Ferguson noted:
Since March 2004, there has been a 59 per cent
increase in one-year adjustable rate mortgages.
But that just means that they have become more
expensive for new borrowers. The key question
LV:KHQGRH[LVWLQJ$50·VUHVHW"7KHDQVZHU
Soon. According to calculations published by
%DUURQ·VLQ)HEUXDU\RYHUWKHQH[WWZR\HDUVWKH
monthly payments on about $600 billion of
mortgages taken out by borrowers in the so-
called subprime market (those with checkered or
nonexistent credit histories) will increase by as
much as 50 per cent. This is because many
$50·V KDYH WZR-year teaser periods to entice
borrowers. After that, the meaning of adjustable
becomes painfully apparent.187
We were warned.
Now, we are being warned that the subprime loans given
by lenders to borrowers with good credit, Alt-A loans, are about
to go bust as well. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have long
claimed that Alt-A loans were not subprime mortgages, but a
VXEVHW RI ´$µ PRUWJDJHV188 However, in emails disclosed at a
congressional hearing, it became apparent that staffers at both
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had warned their senior
executives about risk factors associated with acquiring Alt-A
mortgages.189 Despite these warnings, both agencies increased

186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.
Ferguson, supra note 175, at 50.
Browning, supra note 155.
Id.
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their purchases in an ´RUJ\ RI MXQN PRUWJDJH GHYHORSPHQWµ190
Congress was not amused.191
On the horizon is an increase in the number of defaults on
another type of mortgage: payment-option mortgages. Like
subprime mortgages, payment-option mortgages are given with
an adjustable rate. They typically carry a low introductory rate
and give borrowers multiple payment options that may not
cover the interest due, a practice known as negative
amortization.192 When the interest rate is recast, borrowers
can see their monthly payment increase by up to 60%.
However, unlike subprime mortgages, payment-option
mortgages were offered only to borrowers with the best
credit.193 Therefore, it came as a surprise when FirstFed
Financial Corp., a major California option mortgage issuer who
was thought to have pared back on risky lending, reported a
loss of $70 million in the first quarter of 2008.194 Forty percent
of its borrowers had become at least thirty days delinquent
after their option mortgages were recast.195 This was viewed as
a bad sign, and could be an indication of the next mortgage
debacle.196
In summation, it is appropriate to quote Professor
Elizabeth Warren of Harvard Law School, who in her article,
Making Credit Safer: The Case for Regulation, wrote that due
WR JRYHUQPHQWDO UHJXODWLRQ ´>L@W LV LPSRVVLEOH >LQ WKH 8QLWHG
States] to buy a toaster that has a one-in-five chance of
EXUVWLQJ LQWR IODPHV DQG EXUQLQJ GRZQ \RXU KRXVHµ EXW
´LQQRYDWLRQ
LQ
ILQDQFLDO
products
has
produced
incomprehensible terms and sharp practices that have left
IDPLOLHV DW WKH PHUF\ RI WKRVH ZKR ZULWH WKH FRQWUDFWVµ197 It
should be noted that Professor Warren, who is the head of the
Congressional Oversight Panel evaluating the effectiveness of
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Ruth Simon, FirstFed Grapples With Payment²Option Mortgages;;
Loans Could Be Next Nightmare for Banking Sector, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6,
2008, at A3.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Warren, supra note 179, at 34.
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the TARP payments to banks, has come under criticism from
conservatives for her views about debtor responsibility for the
financial crisis.198
The evidence is in. From across the spectrum, it would be
very hard indeed to find someone who does not concur that the
lack of appropriate governmental regulation added to the air
within an expanding real estate bubble. The question now is
whether they have learned enough from the mistakes of the
past to lead us into a new age of American capitalism where all
are protected from the most harmful, solely short-term, and
purely self-interested, aspects of the free marketplace. After
all, even Alan Greenspan has conceded that the marketplace
does a pretty poor job of regulating itself.199 After a twenty-
year vacation, it is time for regulators to return to work.
VII. Consumerism
$V :DOW .HOO\ IDPRXVO\ SRLQWHG RXW ´:H KDYH PHW WKH
HQHP\DQGKHLVXVµ200
We have already discussed how consumerism³the
obsession to buy more and bigger things, from toys to
electronics to vacation homes³through the use of the home
equity ATM machine, contributed to the creation of the real
estate bubble and its eventual bursting.201 The Darwinian
question subject to debate is which came first: consumerism,
the propensity to buy things on credit, or the bubble? Jackson
Lears, the author of Something for Nothing, Luck in America,
says that the answer is the former³debt-financed
consumerism came first.202 In his article, The American Way of
Debt: We Moralize About It. Then We Borrow, Lear discussed
the history of consumer debt in America.203 Noting that
´$PHULFDQV DUH DZDVK LQ UHG LQN FRQVXPHU LQGHEWHGQHVV LV
198. Susan Schmidt, Policing TARP Proves Tricky, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20,
2009, at A4.
199. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
200. WALT KELLY, POGO: WE HAVE MET THE ENEMY AND HE IS US (1987).
201. See supra Part IV.
202. See Jackson Lears, The American Way of Debt: We Moralize About
It. Then We Borrow, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2006 (Magazine), at 13.
203. Id.
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soaring, the savings rate is down to zero and people are filing
IRUEDQNUXSWF\DWUHFRUGUDWHVµKHVDLG
[t]he equation of debt and decline assumes that
once upon a time Americans lived within their
means and saved for what they bought. This is
fantasy: there never was a golden age of thrift.
Debt has always played an important role in
$PHULFDQV· OLYHV - not merely as a means of
instant gratification but also as a strategy for
survival and tool for economic advance.204
Therefore, it should come as no surprise that American
consumers were number five on Time PDJD]LQH·V OLVW RI WKH
twenty-five people to blame for the financial crisis.205 We were
charged with living beyond our means through borrowing.206
Time QRWHG WKDW ´>K@RXVHKROG GHEW LQ WKH 86    ]RRPHG WR
PRUHWKDQRILQFRPHLQXSIURPLQµ207
The operative image of the American consumer over the
last five years or so has been one of a family borrowing against
the rising equity in its home, in effect turning its home into an
ATM machine to purchase more and more. The examples are
legion. George Packer introduces us to Jennifer and Ron
Formosa.208 She worked as a bank clerk and he worked in
construction. Using a $110,000 mortgage, they built a three
family home in Cape Coral, Florida.209 ´>7@KH\UHILQDQFHGZLWK
Washington Mutual [and] took out an HTXLW\ OLQHµ LQ RUGHU WR
pay their bills.210 The value of their house rose to $280,000.211
They continued to borrow and used the proceeds to put in a
patio, pay off the cars, and to buy a boat;; and then there were
the vacations, cruises, going to Orlando, taking the kids to

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.
See Gibbs, supra note 4, at 22.
Id.
Id.
Packer, supra note 111, at 86.
Id.
Id. at 88.
Id.
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Disney³just being Americans.212 Then, Ron lost his job when
the construction industry imploded in Florida.213 The loss of
their home came next.214 The Formosa family thus became one
of the 24,000 families on the foreclosure docket in Lee County
that year.215
Even when families act conservatively, they can be trapped
in their homes when the rock of their debt meets the hard place
RI WKHLU KRPH·V GHFUHDVLQJ YDOXH  7KH Wall Street Journal
recently focused on the effects of the collapse of real estate
prices in Maricopa, Arizona.216 Maricopa, which is located near
Phoenix, grew from a population of 1,400 a decade ago to
37,000 in 2008.217 7KH &DPSEHOO·V ZHUH D W\SLFDO IDPLO\ ZKR
moved into the area in 2005 when Mr. Campbell accepted a job
transfer from San Diego to Phoenix.218 ´7KH\VFUDSHGWRJHWKHU
a $50,000 down payment to buy a new four-bedroom home in
0DULFRSD IRU µ219 Today, because of overbuilding
caused by easy money in the past, Ms. Campbell believes the
house is worth half as much, and that may even be
optimistic.220 7KHGHYHORSHUZKREXLOWWKH&DPSEHOO·V·KRPHLV
RIIHULQJ VLPLODU KRPHV LQ WKH VDPH VXEGLYLVLRQ ´IURP
.µ221 Zillow.com says that 75% of the homeowners in the
area owe more on their mortgages than their homes are
worth.222 7KRVHLQGLYLGXDOVOLNHWKH&DPSEHOO·VDUHWUDSSHGLQ
their homes and cannot move unless they are willing to take a
substantial loss. Yet, with a 20% down payment, they did
nothing wrong.
In June 2006, before the real estate bubble burst in 2007,
the New York Times devoted an entire Sunday magazine to
American debt.
Future historians, in their attempt to
212. Id.
213. Id. at 210.
214. Id. at 92.
215. See Corkery, supra note 126.
216. James R. Hagerty, After The Boom: In Maricopa, Ariz., a Paradise
Found and Lost, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2009, at A12.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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understand how the current recession got started, will most
certainly be reading this prescient edition of the New York
Times for clues. For our purposes, two quotes will be sufficient.
Niall Ferguson, a professor of history at Harvard wrote:
In the past five years alone, the value of U.S.
home-mortgage debt has increased by nearly $3
trillion. Not all of that borrowing went to pay for
real estate, the traditional function of mortgages.
In 2004, net mortgage borrowing not used for the
purchase of new homes amounted to nearly $600
billion.
The International Monetary Fund
estimates that this kind of equity extraction has
risen from less than 2 percent of household
disposable income in the year 2000 to more than
9 percent in the third quarter of last year.223
Additionally, Jackson Lears explained:
The upward spiral of earning and spending
VXUYLYHG XQWLO WKH ·V ZKHQ WKH PLGcentury
ideal of corporate citizenship evaporated in the
harsher climate of renewed international
competition. Fearing foreign rivals, American
business ended its implicit social contract with
unions by seeking cheap labor in overseas
markets. During the ·V ZKLOH UHDO LQFRPH
continued to stagnate for most Americans, the
ascendancy of Ronald Reagan gave government
sanction to unprecedented consumer spending.
5HDJDQ·V UKHWRULFDO UHIXVDO RI OLPLWV FRPELQHG
with the deregulation of the lending industry to
detach dreams of luxury from previous
constraints. As money worship mounted, job
security disappeared and inequalities widened,
pundits spoke of a new Gilded Age. By the
·VEORDWHGLFRQVRIDIIOXHQFHSUROLIHUDWHGWKH
gargantuan pseudo-military vehicle, the 10,000-
223. Ferguson, supra note 175, at 48.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/18

40

220

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:180

square foot hacienda. A bigger standard package
of household goods demanded deeper debt and
accelerated the pace of the consumer treadmill.
No one ZDQWHGWRORRNOLNHD´ORVHUµ224
Even former Senator Phil Gramm, deflecting the blame for
the financial crisis from himself to everyone else, wrote in an
Op-Ed piece for the Wall Street Journal:
7KH)HG·V VKDUS SURORQJHG UHGXFWLRQLQLQWHUHVW
rates stimulated a housing market that was
already booming - triggering six years of double-
digit increases in housing prices during a period
when the general inflation rate was low. Buyers
ERXJKW KRXVHV WKH\ FRXOGQ·W DIIRUG EHOLHYLQJ
they could refinance in the future and benefit
from the ongoing appreciation. Lenders assumed
that even if everything else went wrong,
properties could still be sold for more than they
cost and the loans could be repaid.
This
mentality permeated the market from the
originator to the holder of securitized mortgages,
from the rating agency to the financial
regulator.225
Then, in the fall of 2007, shortly after the beginning of the
credit crisis in May 2007, the real estate bubble burst and
consumers stopped buying. Soon thereafter, major retailers
VXFK DV /LQHQV ¶Q 7KLQJV 6KDUSHU ,PDJH 0HUY\Q·V &LUFXLW
City, Steve & Barr\·V )RUWXQRII·V DQG PDQ\ RWKHUV EHJDQ WR
file for Chapter 11 under the Bankruptcy Code.226 ´7KH 
new commercial bankruptcy filings in May [2008] also

224. Lears, supra note 202, at 15.
225. Gramm, supra note 137.
226. See, e.g., Retailers and Bankruptcy, DEAL.COM, June 2, 2009,
http://www.thedeal.com/newsweekly/dealwatch/retailers-and-bankruptcy.php
GLVFXVVLQJ ´VRPH RI 7KH 'HDO V UHWDLO EDQNUXSWF\ FRYHUDJH DQG >DQDO\]LQJ@
what might be in store for some not yet bankrupt but possibly teetering
[retailers]µ 
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UHSUHVHQWHG D  LQFUHDVH IURP 0D\     µ227 On the
consumer side, the New York Times reported that:
[b]y the end of 2008, slightly more than 9 percent
of all mortgages in the United States were either
delinquent or in foreclosure, according to the
Mortgage Bankers Association. The number of
loans in foreclosure hit a new record of 2.3
million last year, more than double the volume in
2006, and industry analysts estimate that it will
hit at least 3 million in 2009 in the absence of a
government rescue.228
By February 2009, the financial uncertainty had driven
consumer spending off the proverbial cliff. The malaise and
lack of spending even reached the style pages of the
newspapers. Restaurant and store openings, which only last
season were lavish affairs, were suddenly becoming less
spectacular, even when owners tried to make them fabulous.
Club kids, the harbingers of new styles, are beginning to lose
cachet to³you may gasp here³Barbie.229 In the face of the
grim economy, Kenny Kenny, club kid and style maven,
admitted WKDW ´>W@KH RQO\ ZD\ \RX FDQ SRVVLEO\ PDNH LW
through, darling, is to face reality . . . . Fabulousness only goes
VRIDUµ230
Fashion Week in New York, universally known for its
celebrity sightings, over-the-top displays, and excess, was
´LQYDGHGLQVWHDGE\DSDOSDEOHJULPQHVVWKLV\HDUµ231 ´>6@RPH
were taken aback by just how somber the mood hanging over
the crowds at Fashion Week was;; several of the most devoted
fashionistas said that even they were thrown into a bit of an
H[LVWHQWLDO FULVLVµ232 A Wall Street hedge fund manager who
227. Jacqueline Palank, Bankruptcies Rise Sharply on Credit Woes,
WALL ST. J., June 4, 2008, at B6B.
228. Andrews, supra note 46.
229. Guy Trebay, 7KHUH·V 7URXEOH LQ WKH 7ZHHWV, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19,
2009, at E1.
230. Id.
231. Cara Buckley, In the Tents, Most Faces Feature Model Pout, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2009, at A16.
232. Id.
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was a guest at one of the shows epitomized it all. At the end of
the show, he pulled his Blackberry from his cashmere coat
pocket, which by the way was missing a button, checked the
stock market and groaned ´,·P ZDWFKLQJ WKH ZKROH WKLQJ
PHOWLQJGRZQµ233
Even the purveyors of luxury goods, who many thought
would withstand the crisis, began to experience financial pain
and even started to lay off workers. Some in the industry were
beginning to wonder whether a prolonged slump in consumer
spending could result in an eternal backlash against
conspicuous consumption.234 Maybe we should all begin to
worry.
Given the fact that the economy depends upon
FRQVXPHUVSHQGLQJIRUJURZWKWKHZRUGVRIWKH)RUPRVD·VZKR
ZHPHWHDUOLHUVKRXOGJLYHXVVRPHSDXVH´,·OOVDYHP\PRQH\
instead of spend it . . . . , GRQ·W WKLQN ,·OO HYHU ZDQW WR EX\ D
KRXVHDJDLQµ235
As former Senator Gramm conceded, consumer spending
based on consumer borrowing was a significant factor in
creating the real estate bubble.236 It would be ironic if the slide
in spending³the basis of the American marketplace³caused
by the bursting of the real estate bubble, had the perverse
effect of endangering the very core of American capitalism.
Given our societal history of debt, perhaps we need not worry.
However, the Japanese experience offers a caveat. From the
1990s through about 2000, the Japanese went through such a
severe HFRQRPLFPDODLVHWKDWWKHSHULRGZDVGXEEHG´7KH/RVW
'HFDGHµ237 ´6WXQWHG ZDJHV DQG GHSUHVVHG VWRFN SULFHV   
turn[ed] [the] once free-VSHQGLQJ >-DSDQHVH@ FRQVXPHU LQWRµ D
careful and constant saver.238 Even after their economy
recovered, fueled in part by an export boom to the United
States and China, many Japanese have continued to save.239
Their unwillingness to spend produced a significant drag on
233. Id.
234. Sellers Confront Lapse of Luxury, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2009, at
C10.
235. Packer, supra note 111.
236. Gramm, supra note 137.
237. Hiroko Tabuchi, When Consumers Cut Back: An Object Lesson From
Japan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at A1.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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the Japanese economy. Rampant consumption is frowned upon
and many people now want to live the simple life. As a result,
WKH-DSDQHVHHFRQRP\LVLQ´IUHH-fall because it cannot rely on
domestic conVXPSWLRQ WR SLFN XS WKH VODFNµ240 Japanese
consumers felt compelled to save more in case they lost their
jobs, thus creating a vicious deflationary cycle.241 Could the
same happen here in the United States?
Consumer spending, fueled by an unprecedented increase
in the value of American homes and the belief that home prices
would never go down, certainly contributed to the perpetuation
of the real estate bubble. When the bubble burst, and home
prices actually started to go down, credit dried up. Consumers
stopped spending, businesses dependent on that spending
began to go under, and consumers began to spend even less.
More businesses, therefore, went out of business, more
consumers lost their livelihoods³you see where this is going.
The tea leaves are not good. In the fourth quarter of 2008, the
$PHULFDQ´JURVVGRPHVWLFSURGXFWIHOODWDQDnnualized rate of
6.2 percent, the steepest decline since the 1982 recession . . .µ242
7KH 8QLYHUVLW\ RI 0LFKLJDQ UHSRUWHG ´DQ LQGH[ RI FRQVXPHU
confidence fell for the first time in three months, to 56.3, from
After years of unbridled
 LQ -DQXDU\ >@µ243
consumption, American consumers are petrified. We cannot
put this recession behind us until we start to spend again. This
is the irony of ironies. Consumer spending based upon
consumer borrowing helped to create the real estate bubble, the
bursting of which led to our current financial recession. Now,
to restart the economy, consumers have to start spending and
borrowing again, but, as discussed above, lenders, because of
losses resulting from profligate lending during the boom years,
do not currently have the capital to lend.244 ´9LFLRXVµ PD\ EH
the entirely proper word to describe the economic cycle in
which we now find ourselves.

240. Id. ´,Q WKH ODVW WKUHH PRQWKV RI  -DSDQ·V HFRQRP\ VKUDQN DW
DQDQQXDOL]HGUDWHRISHUFHQWµ 
241. See id.
242. Catherine Rampell, G.D.P. Revision Suggests Long, Steeper
Downturn, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2009, at B3.
243. Id.
244. See discussion supra Part IV.
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I began this section with a quote from Jackson Lears:
´'HEWKDVDOZD\VSOD\HGDQLPSRUWDQWUROHLQ$PHULFDQV·OLYHV
² not merely as a means of instant gratification but also as a
VWUDWHJ\IRUVXUYLYDODQGDWRROIRUHFRQRPLFDGYDQFHµ245 And,
for the sake of the global economy, I think we all should hope
that Mr. Lears is correct.
VIII. Mortgage Fraud
Professor Elizabeth Warren quoted experts as estimating
WKDW ´IUDXG DQG GHFHSWLRQ VWULSSHG  ELOOLRQ LQ HTXLW\ IURP
homeowners, particularly from elderly and working-class
IDPLOLHVHYHQEHIRUHWKHVXESULPHFULVLVJRWLQWRIXOOVZLQJµ246
´>/@HQGHUV>ZHUHH[SHFWHG@WRLQFXU about $2.5 billion in losses
DVDUHVXOWRIPRUWJDJHIUDXGLQµ247 The Mortgage Asset
5HVHDUFK ,QVWLWXWH ´0$5,µ  LQ LWV 4XDUWHUO\ )UDXG 5HSRUW
dated December 2, 2008, reported that during the second
quarter of 2008, the number of incidents of fraud and verified
misrepresentations
submitted
by
mortgage
industry
participants increased by 45% over the same period in 2007.248
According to MARI, the FBI investigates mortgage fraud in two
GLVWLQFW DUHDV ´IUDXG IRU SURILWµ DQG ´IUDXG IRU SURSHUW\µ249
Fraud for property covers individuals who misstate their
income or assets in order to qualify for a mortgage.250 Fraud
for profit involves industry insiders, such as appraisers,
brokers, title personnel, and lenders, who conspire to obtain
mortgages.251 Committing fraud for housing is an illegal
action, which is perpetrated solely by borrowers.252 Fully 80%
245. Lears, supra note 202, at 13.
246. Warren, supra note 179, at 37.
247. Bob Tedeschi, The Widening Web of Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6,
2008, at RE10 (citing a report produced by the financial consultant firm
TowerGroup, Needham, Mass.).
248. MORTGAGE ASSET RESEARCH INST., MARI QUARTERLY FRAUD REPORT
2
(2008)
[hereinafter
MARI
2008
REPORT],
available
at
http://www.marisolutions.com/pdfs/mba/mortgage-fraud-report-2008Q2.pdf.
249. MARI,
Understanding
Mortgage
Fraud,
http://www.marisolutions.com/mortgage-fraud.asp (last visited Sept. 27,
2009).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. See id.
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of all reported fraud losses involve collaboration or collusion by
industry insiders, basically fraud for profit.253 The types of
fraud for profit include equity skimming, property flipping, and
mortgage-related identity theft.254
Equity skimming, or as it is better known in New York,
KRPH HTXLW\ WKHIW DOVR NQRZQ DV ´GHHG WKHIWµ RU ´IRUHFORVXUH
UHVFXHµ  starts with a homeowner, usually elderly, who is
facing, or is in, foreclosure.255 The mortgage, which is in
foreclosure, is usually in an amount that is only a small
IUDFWLRQ RI WKH YDOXH RI WKH SURSHUW\  $ WKLUG SDUW\ ´LQYHVWRUµ
approaches the homeowner in foreclosure and offers to save the
homeowner from foreclosure. To do this, the investor requires
that the homeowner, sometimes with disclosure, but more often
without, convey the mortgaged property to the investor. The
investor promises to return the property to the homeowner
once that person meets an easy payment plan. Of course, the
homeowner in foreclosure can never meet the terms of the plan.
Often, the homeowner never realizes, or is never told, that he
or she has conveyed the property to the investor. Using the
deed, the investor obtains a new mortgage based upon the real
or inflated value of the property. The new mortgage goes into
foreclosure often without the knowledge of the original
KRPHRZQHU ZKR WKH LQYHVWRU RQO\ PRQWKV EHIRUH ´UHVFXHGµ
from foreclosure.
Over the past few years, such home equity thefts from the
elderly became epidemic in areas of New York City that were
experiencing gentrification and rapid increasing property
valuations. Recently, the Wall Street Journal reported on the
case of Daphne and William Webb, an elderly couple in
Montclair, New Jersey, who found themselves the victims of a
´IRUHFORVXUH UHVFXHµ VFKHPH256 After suffering a heart attack,
Mrs. Webb left her job.257 The couple soon fell behind on their

253. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Operation Quick Flip Stats,
http://www.fbi.gov/page2/dec05/chartsandgraphs.pdf (last visited Sept. 27,
2009).
254. MARI 2008 REPORT, supra note 248.
255. Philip Shiskin, :KHQ¶5HVFXH·0HDQV(YLFWLRQ, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26,
2009, at D1.
256. Id.
257. Id.
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mortgage and their lender started a foreclosure action.258 Two
investors5RQDOG/RVQHUDQG$O\VVD$]UDQFDPHWRWKH:HEE·V
rescue with a sale-leaseback offer.259 7KH :HEE·V VROG WKHLU
home to Ms. Azan for $820,000 in March 2006, but they
received no cash from the sale.260 They signed a $2,600 a
month lease which provided that they could buy their house
back for $45,000 after paying rent for eighteen months.261
Already, the math does not add up. Ms. Azran obtained a
$533,000 mortgage from Credit Suisse, even though she had
allegedly admitted on her loan application to not having a job
and only having $100 in assets.262 Ms. Azran fell behind on her
mortgage payments (surprise) and Wells Fargo, the loan
servicer for Credit Suisse, commenced a foreclosure action
against Azran.263 7KH :HEE·V KDYH EURXJKW DQ DFWLRQ DJDLQVW
Losner, Azran, and Credit Suisse for fraud, claiming that they
did not understand the documents that they were asked to
sign.264 They assert that Losner, a disbarred attorney, and
Azran cheated them out of $400,000 in equity that they had in
their home.265
A New Jersey court has stayed the foreclosure action and
WKH :HEE·V DUH SD\LQJ WKHLU UHQW LQWR DQ HVFURZ DFFRXQW266
8QGRXEWHGO\ DQ LQYHVWPHQW EDQN SDFNDJHG 0V $]UDQ·V QRZ
non-performing mortgage into a CDO or CMO that is probably
underwater itself. If one multiplies this mortgage by those
taken out by thousands of other homeowners whose stories are
OLNH WKRVH RI WKH :HEE·V RU WKH )RUPRVD·V ZH FDQ VHH KRZ
mortgage-backed securities became so toxic. The underlying
mortgages are either not being paid, or their values have
decreased because of decreasing demand for the houses that
have been pledged as security for the loans.
In order to prevent the type of home equity theft that the
:HEE·V DOOHJHG KDSSHQHG WR WKHP WKH 1HZ <RUN State
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Legislature adopted, and the Governor signed, the Home
Equity Theft Prevention Act, which took effect on February 1,
2007.267 Under the Act, a person deprived of their home equity
had two years to rescind the transaction that led to the loss of
their equity.268 In addition, the Act imposed substantial
criminal and civil penalties upon participants in an equity
skimming transaction.269 The Act imposes much of the burden
of determining which schemes came under its purview to title
underwriters, who would have to bear the cost of claims.270
Because suspect transactions became uninsurable, home equity
theft, after February 1, 2007, no longer took up space on the
front pages. Also, much of the public DQG ODZ HQIRUFHPHQW·V
attention turned to the problems caused by subprime
lending.271
According to MARI, Florida had the most reported
incidents of mortgage fraud in the second quarter of 2008.272
George Packer gives an example of the second type of fraud,
property flipping, in his article, The Ponzi State:
Karen Johnson-Crowther, another real estate
agent in Fort Myers, showed me the sales history
of a property in an upscale gated community
which she had recently bought at a foreclosure
auction. Building had begun in 2005. On
December 29, 2005, the house sold for $399,600.
On December 30, 2005, it sold for $589,000. On
June 25, 2008, it was foreclosed on. Johnson-
267. Home Equity Theft Prevention Act, 2006 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 308
(McKinney). The Act, codified as Chapter 308 of the Laws of 2006, amended
paragraphs (e), (f) and (g) of, and added a new paragraph (h) to, Section 595-a
of the Banking Law, added new Section 265(a) to the Real Property Law and
added Section 1303 to the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law.
268. Id.
269. Id. § 3. See also Michael J. Berey, Home Equity Theft Prevention
Act Took Effect Feb. 1, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 26, 2007, at 4 (providing a detailed
analysis of the Home Equity Theft Prevention Act);; Marvin N. Bagwell, Home
(TXLW\7KHIW3UHYHQWLRQ$FW7KH7LWOH&RPSDQ\·V3HUVSHFWLYH, N.Y. L.J., Aug.
13, 2007, at S6 (discussing land title trends).
270. MARI 2008 REPORT, supra note 248.
271. Marvin N. Bagwell, Home Equity Theft Prevention Act: Subprime
Crisis May Be Masking Effects of Statute, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 9, 2008, at 5.
272. MARI 2008 REPORT, supra note 248, at 2.
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Crowther bought it in December for $325,000. I
said that the one day increase in value must
have been some kind of record, and she looked at
PHSLW\LQJO\´1Rµ273
Alex Sink, the State Treasurer tROG3DFNHUSRLQWEODQN´7KDW·V
DIUDXGXOHQWWUDQVDFWLRQµ274
+HUHLVDQRWKHUH[DPSOHLQ0U3DFNHU·VZRUGV
Last fall, Michael Van Sickler, of the St.
Petersburg Times, tracked the real-estate deals of
a local tattoo-parlor owner named Sang-Min
Kim, also known as Sonny. Starting in 2004,
Sonny Kim made ninety sales around Tampa,
mostly in poor neighborhoods, on which he
cleared four million dollars. Van Sickler found
WKDW PDQ\ RI .LP·V EX\HUV ZKR SXW OLWWOH RU QR
money down were, untraceable, some had been
convicted of drug dealing and other crimes. Kim,
who has not been charged with any crimes and
could not be reached for this article, closed a
third of his deals with a title agent named
Howard Gaines, who now faces up to forty-five
years in prison on a fraud conviction elsewhere
in Florida.
According to law enforcement
experts, drug dealers often become flippers, in
order to launder money. . . .
....
. . . .LP·V GHDOV KDG EHHQ ILQDQFHG E\
Wachovia, Wells Fargo, Bank of America,
Lehman Brothers, Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac.275
Illinois ranked third in reported incidents of mortgage
fraud according to MARI.276 Susan Chandler of the Chicago
273.
274.
275.
276.

Packer, supra note 111, at 84.
Id.
Id. at 84-85.
MARI 2008 REPORT, supra note 248, at 2.
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Tribune wrote a series of investigative articles describing a
fraud that³except for a dead body in a red tracksuit³was very
similar to the one in Florida, described above.277 In Illinois, as
in Florida, a realtor, mortgage broker, title agent, and straw
buyer consSLUHG WR VWHDO SURSHUW\ IURP WKH GHFHDVHG·V PRWKHU
who was also deceased.278 The Chicago case attracted national
attention in the real property bar because the title underwriter,
Ticor Title, denied the title claim made by the lender,
Countrywide, because RI &RXQWU\ZLGH·V JURVV QHJOLJHQFH LQ
funding the loan.279 Ticor asserted that &RXQWU\ZLGH·VDFWLRQV
FDPHXQGHUWKHSROLF\·V´DFWVRIWKHLQVXUHG·VµH[FOXVLRQ280 The
point is made. I will pass on discussing cases from the state
that is ranked number two, California. You can just imagine.
The third type of mortgage fraud, identity theft, used to be
so simple. Title people of a certain age might remember the
first time that a borrower showed up at a mortgage closing
with a woman who he claimed was his wife, but who later
turned out to be his girlfriend. Then, equal opportunity
arrived, and with it, equal opportunity fraud;; the wife brought
her boyfriend to the closing. What is good for the goose is good
for the gander. Title companies reacted by requiring photo
identification at the closing.
The crooks then began to
PDQXIDFWXUH IDNH GULYHUV· OLFHQVHV  1RZ ZLWK WKH DLG RI
FRPSXWHUV DQG ´GXPSVWHU GLYLQJµ WKRVH LQWHQW XSRQ
FRPPLWWLQJ IUDXG ZLOO VWHDO D SHUVRQ·V HQWLUH LGHQWLW\  7KH
victim may not find out that she even purchased the property
until she receives a foreclosure notice in the mail. Such claims
are ruinous for everyone concerned³from lender to title
company to victim.281 No one profits except the person or
persons who perpetuated the fraud.
277. Susan Chandler, This House was a Steal, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 24, 2008,
at 1.
278. Id.;; Susan Chandler, Title Firm Ready to do Battle, CHI. TRIB., Aug.
17, 2008, at 1 [hereinafter Chandler, Battle].
279. Chandler, Battle, supra note 278.
280. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Ticor Title Ins. Co. v.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 2008-CH-25938 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed July 18,
2008), 2008 WL 3991700. See also Marvin N. Bagwell, Obligation Contested:
,QVXUHU·V6XLW&RXOG+DYH1DWLRQDO,PSOLFDWLRQV, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 8, 2008, at 5;;
Chandler, Battle, supra note 278.
281. See generally Marvin N. Bagwell, Identity Theft Fraud Is Alive and
Well, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 8, 2005, at S5.
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When identity theft is added to equity skimming or
flipping, the damages can be huge. The New York Times
reported that federal prosecutors recently indicted four
individuals who conspired to obtain $10 million in mortgage
loans, using persons living in a halfway house and public
housing as homebuyers.282 It appears that flipping, with the
aid of appraisers and a bank employee, may have been
involved.283 When the mortgage fraud also involves investors,
that is, when people provide a lender with funds to make
mortgages, the losses can take years to resolve and ruin lives.
It took a decade, but authorities are now holding Wayne Puff in
jail for orchestrating a Ponzi scheme on top of a mortgage fraud
that may cost New Jersey investors $55 million.284
It should be clear from the above discussion on
securitization that mortgage lenders deserve part of the blame
for the real estate bubble.285 Including Angelo Mozilo of
Countrywide at number one, eleven bankers also appear on
Time PDJD]LQH·VOLVW  -RH&DVVDQRRI$,*DWnumber seven;;
(2) Dick Fuld of Lehman Brothers at number eleven;; (3) Marion
and Herb Sandler of World Savings Bank at number twelve;; (4)
6WDQ 2·1HDO RI 0HUULOO /\QFK DW QXPEHU ILIWHHQ   -RKQ
Devaney, a hedge fund purchaser of option ARMs, at number
eighteen;; (6) Lew Ranieri of Salomon Brothers, who invented
mortgage pooling, at number twenty;; (7) Fred Goodwin of the
Royal Bank of Scotland at number twenty-two;; (8) Sandy Weill
of Citigroup at number twenty-three;; and (9) Jimmy Cayne of
Bear Stearns at number twenty-five.286
Not only did these mortgage lenders and buyers create, sell
and buy mortgage securities that resulted in devastating losses
throughout the financial markets nationwide at the retail level,
but their shoddy underwriting permitted fraud to occur. For
H[DPSOH WKH 2QWDULR 7HDFKHUV· 3HQVLRQ 3ODQ %RDUG LQ D VXLW
ILOHG DJDLQVW :DVKLQJWRQ 0XWXDO %DQN ´:D0Xµ  ZKLFK LQ

282. Benjamin Weiser, 4 Indicted in $10 Million Subprime Mortgage
Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2009, at A28.
283. Id.
284. Russ Buettner, )LUVW,QYHVWRUV·5HDO(VWDWH%RRPDQG1RZD%XVW,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at LI8.
285. See discussion supra Part III.
286. Gibbs, supra note 4.
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order to prevent its collapse, the Federal Government arranged
for it to be taken over by JPMorgan Chase), complained that it
was all about the number of loans and not the quality.287 The
HPSOR\HHV ZHUH LQVWUXFWHG WR DSSURYH ORDQV ´QR PDWWHU
ZKDWµ288 ´7KH\ GLGQ·W FDUH LI ZH ZHUH JLYLQJ ORDQV WR SHRSOH
WKDW GLGQ·W TXDOLI\  ,QVWHDG LW ZDV KRZ PDQ\ ORDQV GLG \RX
guys close and fuQG"µ289 Proper documentation or not, the
securitization machine had to be fed.
As noted above, mortgage fraud has numerous
permutations. We are probably not aware of all of them, and
most certainly, new ones are being perpetuated and invented
every day. IQDQVZHUWRWKHTXHVWLRQ´:K\GR\RXUREEDQNV"µ,
Willie Sutton is reputed WR KDYH UHVSRQGHG ´>E@HFDXVH WKDW LV
ZKHUHWKHPRQH\LVµ290 When it comes to mortgage fraud, the
same holds true, except that instead of one, or even a dozen
banks being the victim, this time it was an entire global
financial system. Although we may never know the amount,
there can be no doubt that mortgage fraud was a major
contributor to the inflation of the real estate bubble and to its
eventual bursting.
IX. Conclusion
People working in the title industry have been greatly
affected by the bursting of the real estate bubble. Major
XQGHUZULWHUV &RPPRQZHDOWK DQG /DZ\HUV· 7LWOH QRZ KDYH
new corporate owners. Hundreds of title offices have been
closed. Many companies, especially on the West Coast, have
entered bankruptcy. Hundreds of employees in New York, and
thousands across the nation have been laid off. Despite the
suffering, many people in the industry question whether we
could have done anything to prevent the real estate bubble
from being created and from bursting. After all, we attended
the closings and saw many transactions where we knew that
287. Gretchen Morgenson, :DV7KHUHD/RDQ,W'LGQ·W/LNH", N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 2008, at BU1.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. See Albin Krebs, Willie Sutton is Dead at 79, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,
1980, at A31.
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the borrower could not pay the mortgage and had no idea what
a subprime, adjustable rate, or negative amortization meant.
We often predicted, with some accuracy, that the borrower
would default, and that in ninety, maybe 120, days, we would
be running a foreclosure search on the same property. Perhaps
we could have prevented a closing every now and then, but the
purpose of this over-lengthy Article was to show that it would
KDYH EHHQ DNLQ WR RQH SHUVRQ·V SXWWLQJ KLV RU KHU ILQJHU LQ D
dike that surrounded not only Wall Street, but also London,
Dublin, Beijing, Tokyo, Taiwan, Paris, Sydney, Rihayd, Dubai,
Singapore, Caracas, Mexico City, Toronto³anywhere money
was to be made.
Quite frankly, the financial forces arrayed against anyone
trying to stop the flood would have made deterrence impossible.
Title people need not feel guilty. Nobody can live without air.
The forces of securitization, globalization, lack of regulation,
speculation, consumerism, and mortgage fraud would have
conspired to render any Cassandra voiceless and impotent.
The only saving grace is that we have the opportunity to learn
from the current crisis so that we do not repeat our borrowing
and investment errors. The next time, and there will be a next
time, we will not make the same mistake. The next bubble will
not involve real estate. After all, no one really speculates
obscenely on the price of tulips anymore. Or do they?

53

